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ABSTRACT
How ought a democracy select its judges? Critics in Canada, England, and
Wales invoke the democratic values of accountability and transparency to call for a
diminution in prime ministerial control over judicial appointments. In the United
States, Article III of the Constitution's text directs that the President nominate-
with the advice and consent of the Senate-life-tenured federal judges. Bitter
conflicts about particular nominees have produced many proposals for changes of
that system. And in those states that rely on various forms of judicial election,
concerns focus on funding and campaigning. In short, both globally and locally,
democracies debate the legitimacy and wisdom of various methods used to endow
individuals with the state's power of adjudication.
This diversity of techniques for judicial selection illuminates the complex
relationship of adjudication to democracies. Democracy tells one a good deal
about rights to justice, equality before and in the law, and constraints on the power
of the state, its courts included. But absent a claim that all government officials in
a democracy must be elected, it is difficult to derive from democracy any particular
process for picking judges. In contrast, democratic principles do rule out a few
procedures for judicial selection-such as by inheritance or through techniques
that systematically exclude persons by race, sex, ethnicity, and class.
In addition to examining the interaction between democratic theory and
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judicial selection, this article details the degree to which the life-tenured (or
"Article III") judiciary in the United States has become anomalous, both when
compared to high court judgeships in other countries and to other kinds of federal
judges-magistrate and bankruptcy judges-in this country. Article III judges
have no mandatory age for retirement nor a fixed, non-renewable term of office.
Rather, they serve relatively long terms-often of more than twenty years. In
addition, they control the timing of their resignations, enabling them to bestow
political benefits on a particular party. Further, Article III judges now have the
authority to appoint hundreds of non-life-tenured federal judges.
A first conclusion is that conflict over life-tenured judgeships is neither
surprising nor necessarily inappropriate. Given the nature and form of power held
by Article III judges, the political import of federal courts in the United States, the
constitutional allocation of power to both the President and the Senate, and
disagreements about what good governance entails, judicial selection is a ready
opportunity for political signaling.
Second, debates about individuals seeking confirmation have been repeatedly
used as a means of articulating legal norms. From the legality of the Jay Treaty in
the eighteenth century to the role of railroads and unions in the nineteenth century
to the rights of women in the twentieth century and gay marriage in the twenty-
first, conflict over nominations has helped to identify certain issues as powerfully
divisive and others as so settled as to be seen as nonpolitical.
Third, to see utility in debate about who shall serve as life-tenured judges
does not mean that the current structure is optimal. With the growth in the number
of life-tenured judgeships at the lower ranks and with the innovations in
information technology, powerful participants in and out of the government have
gained the ability to fill many seats with individuals identified with certain
approaches to American law. Life-tenured appointments were always an
opportunity for patronage, but when the slots were few and the length of tenure
shorter, they could be used less successfully as a means of setting long term
political agendas.
Therefore, and fourth, consideration should be given to revising the federal
process. The Senate ought to increase its efforts to scrutinize nominees at all
levels. Requiring a supermajority rule to confirm is one technique to signify that
the power of judicial appointment is shared and that senators ought to take an
active role in making life-tenured appointments. Further, Congress could create
incentives, such as pension benefits or penalties, to encourage individual judges to
step aside after a specified number of years-thereby generating more openings
and reducing the long term impact of individual appointments. And, just as the
Supreme Court has found constitutional the devolution of judicial power to non-
life-tenured judgeships, it could also reread Article III to permit fixed times for
retirement. Moreover, judges should be required to make more transparent their
work and the rationales for their judgments.
Proposals such as these derive from democratic values of constrained power
and dialogic development of the law. Thus, while the fact of a democracy does not
drive specific selection methods for judges, it does inform rules about the terms of
service and the mode of action of judges. Democracy teaches that no one person
(judges included) ought to hold too much power for too long.
Fifth, such proposals, underscoring the political process and import of
judicial selection in the United States federal system, need not be exported. When
democracies have histories of other techniques for making appointments or have
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more specification of the judicial role, the allocation of power, and rights of
individuals, as well as other means of debating legal norms, one would be hard
pressed to advocate practices that make screening processes as publicly
contentious as in the United States. Turning individuals-who have not yet taken
their seats nor faced the particular legal and factual questions as they emerge
through litigation-into vehicles for debating the shape of social values is neither
the only nor necessarily a good way to have such debates. Both the people and the
ideas become caricatures, and the peculiar decisionmaking processes of
adjudication, with its fact-full specificity, become lost.
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I. THE APPROPRIATELY HIGH PRICE OF ARTICLE III JUDGESHIPS
The immediate problem prompting this Symposium is the conflict
about federal judicial appointments that occurred between 2002 and
2004, when Republicans held the Presidency and by a slim margin also
controlled the Senate. The President nominated a series of individuals
whom the Democrats opposed for lower court judgeships. (That
problem has survived the election of 2004, as the Republicans kept the
Presidency and gained some Senate seats but not the sixty now required
to end filibusters.) The saliency of the conflict has been heightened by
three facts: a keen appreciation of the amount of interpretative power
held by judges, the opportunities to fill a relatively small number of life-
tenured federal judgeships (particularly at the appellate level with
Supreme Court nominations in the offing), and the longstanding role
that the federal judiciary has played in American policymaking.
But the underlying issues go beyond the conflict in the United
States. Countries around the world are considering the relationship
between the idea of democratic government and judicial selection. Who
should select judges? How much public scrutiny ought to accompany
the selection of judges? With what form of information provided to
whom? What do calls for "transparency" and "accountability" mean in
relationship to judicial selection? These questions are not unique to the
United States, as is evident from contemporary proposals in Canada'
and in the United Kingdom 2 to change selection methods for their
I See, e.g., Kirk Makin, High-Court Reform Proposals Imminent: Questioning of Nominees
Could be Among Recommendations Made by Committee, GLOBE & MAIL, April 20, 2004, at A6;
STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, HUMAN RIGHTS, PUBLIC SAFETY AND EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS, REPORT: IMPROVING THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA APPOINTMENTS
PROCESS (House of Commons, Canada, May 2004), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/
committee/CommitteePublication.aspx?Sourceld=84157; Jacob S. Ziegel, Merits Selection and
Democratization of Appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada, 5 CHOICES IRPP 2 (June
1999). In the fall of 2004, two vacancies were filled by an "interim process" that included an
accounting by the Prime Minister before the House of Commons of the process, with mention of
more changes in the future. See Department of Justice, Speaking Notes for Irwin Cotler, Minister
of Justice and Attorney General of Canada on the Occasion of a Presentation to the Ad Hoc
Committee on Supreme Court of Canada Appointments, Aug. 25, 2004, available at
http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/news/sp/2004/doc 3121 .html.
2 In the summer of 2003, the Department of Constitutional Affairs issued a series of
consultation papers, proposing the abolition of the office of Lord Chancellor, the creation of a
Supreme Court for England as a free-standing institution to separate the Law Lords from
Parliament, and different methods of appointing judges. See Department for Constitutional
Affairs, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM: A NEW WAY OF APPOINTING JUDGES (CP10/03 July 2003).
Part of the reform was prompted by concern that the English judiciary's role in the country's
parliament did not satisfy the principles of separation of powers embodied in the European
Convention for Human Rights.
In February of 2004, after receiving comments, revisions were made to a bill to create a
Supreme Court. That court was to have twelve justices, initially assigned by transferring the
current Law Lords and subsequently by appointment through a newly-created Supreme Court
Nominations Commission. See http://www.dca.gov.uk/consult/supremecourt/scresp.htm. The
[Vol. 26:2
HeinOnline -- 26 Cardozo L. Rev.  582 2004-2005
2005] JUDICIAL SELECTION AND DEMOCRACY 583
judiciaries.
Because some of the critics of current processes make claims that
"democratic values" require change, Part II of this Article discusses the
relationship between democratic theory and judicial appointments. As I
explain, the fact that a country is a democracy tells one a good deal
about rights to justice and equality but less than might be expected
about how to select judges. Unless one is of the view that all officials in
a democracy ought to be elected, it is difficult to derive one specific
process for judicial selection from the fact that a country is a
democracy. One may, however, be able to rule out certain criteria or
kinds of procedures for judicial selection-such as by inheritance or by
excluding persons based on their identity as members of certain groups.
I turn in Part III to the details of judicial selection in the federal
system in the United States. Contemporary debates assume that the
term "federal judge" equates with life tenure. But that form of
judgeship is in fact held by a numerical minority of those who now have
the power of adjudication in the federal system. The changing
expectations of justice-as women and men of all colors gained
juridical status-have required the production of a larger supply of
judges. Today, the number of non-life-tenured trial judges (magistrate
and bankruptcy judges) in the federal courts roughly equals the number
of life-tenured trial judges. Moreover, the bulk of federal adjudication
occurs inside federal agencies, also staffed by tens of hundreds of
judges lacking lifetime commissions.
Each form of federal judgeship has its own method of selection.
The variety came into being in response to the demand for judging,
spawned in part by democratic commitments to accessible justice. In
terms of the various selection processes, appointment to serve in the
administrative judiciary depends on success in competitive exams
(enhanced by a few preference points for veterans). Article III judges at
the trial level select the magistrate judges who join their bench, district
by district. Article III appellate judges in each circuit choose
bankruptcy judges, with more than three hundred individuals currently
serving. And, as is familiar, with the advice and consent of the Senate,
the President nominates the Article III judiciary. Below, I explain how
Constitutional Reform Bill was introduced in the House of Lords that month and hearings have
since been held. See United Kingdom Parliament, Constitutional Reform Bill (second reading)
http://bills.ais.co.uk/AC.asp. See generally CONSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION: THE CREATION OF A
SUPREME COURT FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM; DOMESTIC, COMPARATIVE, AND INTERNATIONAL
REFLECTIONS, LEGAL STUDIES: THE JOURNAL OF THE SOCIETY OF LEGAL SCHOLARS (Derek
Morgan ed., 2004) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION]; see also Sally J. Kenney, Britain
Appoints First Woman Law Lord, 87 JUDICATURE 189 (2004) (describing the criticism of the
nomination process in England stemming in part from the absence of women on its highest
bench). As of this writing, some believe that changes will be made in 2005. See William
Goodhart, The Last Lord Chancellor? LEGAL AFF., Jan./Feb. 2005, at 34-35.
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the authority of Article III judges to augment so significantly the ranks
of federal judges raises questions for democratic theory. Similarly, the
length of tenure currently enjoyed by Article III judges also poses a
challenge to democratic principles of diffused power.
As I detail in Part IV, the form that the life-tenured judgeship has
taken in the United States is anomalous when compared with those
created by other democracies which, like the United States, are
committed to judicial independence. Most countries provide mandatory
ages for retirement or for fixed, non-renewable terms of office. 3 In
contrast, in the United States, those who do have life-tenured positions
serve relatively long terms-often of more than twenty years. Not only
do such persons hold the power of judgment for long periods of time,
they also control the timing of their resignations, enabling them to give
political benefits to a particular party.
I argue that both features are problematic for a democracy but are
remediable. Given the flexibility with which the Supreme Court has
approached Article III in the last decades and found constitutional the
devolution of judicial power to non-life-tenured judgeships, Article III
could also be reread to permit fixed times for retirement. Further,
Congress could create incentives such as pension benefits or penalties to
encourage judges to step aside after a set number of years.
In Parts V and VI, I offer an analysis of the process of
appointments in the United States and suggest that a less apologetic
stance towards conflict is appropriate. The political scrutiny of
individuals nominated to hold life-tenured judgeships is an
understandable response to the particular shape, history, and place of
national judgeships in this federation. Given that Article III judges are
at the top of a large judicial hierarchy and hold a rare form of power for
an unusually long period of time, and given that the Constitution
mandates that such judges must be selected through the political
decisions of both the President and the Senate, such judgeships ought to
be doled out sparingly.
That attention is appropriately paid does not mean that the form
taken by the current controversies is optimal. My concern is that the
Senate often does too little rather than too much. Despite all the hoopla,
most persons nominated to be Article III judges are confirmed by large
majorities. Further, much of the political manoeuvering occurs pre-
nomination in an eclectic fashion with less rationality across candidates
than might be hoped. I suggest that, as a means of expressing how
unique life-tenured jobs are in democracies and how deep the political
consensus about the propriety of appointing persons to such positions
3 See Lee Epstein, Jack C. Knight, Jr., & Olga Shvetsova, Comparing Judicial Selection
Systems, 10 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 7, 23 (2001) (surveying twenty-seven European
countries and finding compulsory term limits and/or mandatory retirement in most).
[Vol. 26:2
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ought to be, the Senate should rely on a practice of requiring sixty votes
for approval. Knowing that most confirmation votes currently exceed
that number, I do not imagine that this form of structural intervention
would have a great impact on the number of judges confirmed but rather
that it would underscore the normative peculiarity of life tenure and
help to reduce the sense of entitlement that presidents have about the
selection power.
Of course, other proposals aspiring to reduce the judgeships battles
have appeal, as is illustrated by the many calls for bi-partisan selection
processes4 as well as by the use of merit selection commissions in other
countries.5 But underappreciated in current discussions of federal
appointments is that controversy about individuals to serve as jurists is
both a longstanding feature of American politics and reflective of the
role that law itself plays in American politics. From the nomination of
John Rutledge in 1795 to the nomination of Melvin Fuller in 1888 to the
nomination of Robert Bork in 1987 to the debates during the last four
years, partisans have used individual nominations to make political
arguments about what they hope United States law will be.
Contestation is not a recent artifact of televised Senate hearings or
the conflicts over Robert Bork and Clarence Thomas. Since this
country's founding, the institution of the federal courts has been
understood as a means of creating or limiting national power.6 Further,
since the Federalists' creation of judgeships and selection of judges that
gave rise to the 1803 decision of Marbury v. Madison,7 the identity and
political affiliations of individuals serving as federal judges has been
4 For example, in the spring of 2003, Senator Charles E. Schumer proposed that the
Administration and the Senate "agree to the creation of nominating commissions" (comprised of
"an equal number of Republicans and Democrats") to be convened in each state and circuit to
propose individual candidates to fill vacancies. See Letter from Senator Charles E. Schumer to
President George W. Bush (April 30, 2003), available at http://schumer.senate.gov/Schumer
Website/pressroom/press-releases/PRO1655.html [hereinafter Schumer Proposal]; see also
REPORT TO CHIEF JUDGE JUDITH KAYE (OF THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK) OF THE
COMMISSION TO PROMOTE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 7-10 (June 2004)
(calling for the establishment of independent judicial qualification commissions, with
membership that reflects "the state's great diversity" to recruit candidates, publish lists of well
qualified candidates, and apply consistent and public criteria to all candidates, as well as
proposing non-competitive and non-partisan retention elections, voter education programs, a
committee to deal with judicial campaign conduct, public financing of elections, and in the
interim, requirements for disclosure of financial support), available at
http://www.law.fordham.edulcommission/judicialelections/images/jud-freport.pdf.
5 See, e.g., Hugh Corder, Judicial Authority in a Changing South Africa, in
CONSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION, supra note 2, at 253-74.
6 See Maeva Marcus, Is the Supreme Court a Political Institution?, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
95, 97 (2003) (answering emphatically in the affirmative and describing how Chief Justice John
Jay used his charges to grand juries as occasions to explain the national government).
7 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Given that decision's two hundredth anniversary, a wave of
new discussions about the originality of its holding and the plausibility of its analyses have been
published. See, e.g., Philip Hamberger, Law and Judicial Duty, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2003)
(arguing that judicial review was a feature of English, colonial, and state law before Marbury).
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seen as relevant to the shape that legal doctrine takes.8 Moreover,
debates about individuals seeking confirmation have been repeatedly
used as a means of articulating legal norms. From the legality of the Jay
Treaty in the eighteenth century to the role of railroads and unions in the
nineteenth century to the rights of women in the twentieth century and
gay marriage in the twenty-first, conflict over nominations has helped to
identify certain issues as powerfully divisive and others as so settled as
to be seen as nonpolitical.9
What has changed in the United States is that, with the growth in
the number of life-tenured judgeships at the lower ranks and with the
innovations in information technology, parties in power have gained the
ability to fill many seats with individuals identified with certain
approaches to American law. Life-tenured appointments were always
an opportunity for patronage. But, when the slots were few, they could
be used less successfully as a means of setting long term agendas. As a
consequence, the creation of new judgeships is of political moment, as
can be seen from the fact that Congress is more likely to do so when it
is dominated by the same party that holds the Presidency. 10 And, with
8 See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 6, at 99-100 (describing the rationales for President
Washington's appointment of particular men, coming from state judiciaries, to the federal
judiciary as an effort to "lessen any jealousy the state judiciaries would feel for the new
national... system" and commenting on the awareness of federal jurists of the "political
repercussions" of some of their decisions).
A growing academic literature addresses the relationship between individual judges' party
affiliation, race, gender, and religion to examine correlations and voting patterns of judges. See,
e.g., Sean Farhang & Gregory Wawro, Institutional Dynamics on the U.S. Court of Appeals:
Minority Representation under Panel Decision Making, 20 J.L. & ECON. ORG. 299, 321 (2004)
(summarizing studies and concluding that in addition to an individual judge's gender, race, and
ideological position, the composition of a panel of judges influences how judges rule); Gregory
C. Sisk, Michael Heise, & Andrew P. Morriss, Searching for the Soul of Judicial
Decisionmaking: An Empirical Study of Religious Freedom Decisions, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 491, 492
(2004) (concluding that the most "prominent, salient, and consistent influence on judicial
decisionmaking was religion" in cases involving that issue); David C. Nixon, Separation of
Powers and Appointee Ideology, 20 J.L. & ECON. ORG. 438, 438 (2004) (analyzing nominees to
executive agencies and concluding that the ideology of that set of nominees is affected by the
"ideological tilt in Congress"); Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade & Lisa Michelle Ellman,
Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV.
301 (2004) (finding that, depending on the kind of case, the political party of the appointing
president is a fairly good predictor of an individual judge's vote as is the political party of the
president appointing the other judges on a panel); Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S.
Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1457, 1459 (2003) (arguing that "legal and political
factors" have greater impact than "strategic and litigant-driven factors"). See generally Gregory
C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Judges and Ideology: Public and Academic Debates about Statistical
Measures, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004), available at http://papers.srnn.com/sol2/
papers.cfm?abstractid=521822.
9 See Judith Resnik, Changing Criteria for Judging Judges, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 889 (1990)
[hereinafter Resnik, Changing Criteria for Judging Judges].
10 See John M. DeFigueredo & Emerson H. Tiller, Congressional Control of the Courts: A
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the Expansion of the Federal Judiciary, 39 J.L. & ECON.
435 (1996).
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the swelling ranks and information technologies making visible both the
attitudes of nominees and voting patterns of appointees, politicians have
come to see seats on the federal judiciary as an opportunity for what
Professors Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson call "partisan
entrenchment," by which they mean that a particular party can use its
power of judicial selection to extend temporally that party's authority to
change the governing legal regime."l
Such efforts to capture judiciaries stem not only from elected
politicians but also now from "repeat players," such as the Chamber of
Commerce, the Federalist Society, the American Trial Lawyers'
Association, and the Alliance for Justice, all eager to influence the
selection processes on the state and federal level. Technology has also
facilitated new means of doing combat about judgeships and has
increased the funds needed to wage effective battles over nominations.
Although state judicial elections have drawn much of the fire on the
issue of financing campaigns,' 2 federal judicial appointments are also
expensive processes, with partisans investing significant sums to
promote or to block particular individuals.
In light of the function and history of life-tenured judgeships in the
United States, the intensification of politics around judicial selection in
this country is understandable. Whatever the drafters of the
Constitution intended from their decision to allocate the power of
appointment between the two other branches, 13 the shape of the
contemporary conflict is an artifact of changes over two centuries in the
structure of Senate committees and staff, in the bureaucratization of the
11 See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87
VA. L. REv. 1045, 1066-77 (2001).
12 See William C. Singleton III, The High Price of Justice: Alabama Leads the Nation in High
Court Race Spending, BIRMINGHAM POST-HERALD, June 16, 2004 (listing judicial campaign
fundraising state by state, and noting that between 1993 and 2002, Alabama Supreme Court
judicial candidates raised some $34 million dollars). Recent analyses of financing of judicial
election campaigns indicate that certain private organizations, such as the Chamber of Commerce,
account for contributions of many millions of dollars to campaigns for judges in different states
across the United States. The interest of that group was sparked by views that state courts were
not sufficiently attentive to the interests of the business community, particularly in relationship to
"tort reform." See Anthony Champagne, The Politics of Judicial Selection, 31 POL'Y STUD. J.
413 (2003); Anthony Champagne, The Cycle of Judicial Elections, Texas as a Case Study, 29
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 907 (2002); Anthony Champagne, Modern Judicial Campaigns, 41 JUDGES
J. 17 (2002); see also Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (discussing problems of financing judicial elections). For discussion
of the rise of interest group participation in federal nominations, see ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
COURTS AND CONGRESS 18-19 (1997). Efforts to analyze decisionmaking of state supreme
courts suggest that the form of selection of judges can affect outcomes in certain kinds of cases,
when policy choices present conflicts between identifiable interests. See DANIEL R. PINELLO,
THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL SELECTION METHOD ON STATE-SUPREME-COURT POLICY:
INNOVATION, REACTION, AND ATROPHY (1995).
13 A review of that period can be found in MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 17-29 (2000), as well as in many essays devoted to the meaning of the
phrase "advice and consent." See notes 39 and 184 infra.
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Presidency, in the expansion of federal law, in the kinds and numbers of
federal judges, and in the technology of information.
Further, while a shift to a less contentious process with bi-partisan
selection commissions has a great deal of appeal, such a change requires
bi-partisan commitment to a very different idea of the import of a
federal judgeship. Attitudes in the United States towards judging
assume the political dimensions of legal decisions and that professional
"legal" judgments are not insulated and discrete from their "political"
consequences. Who the life-tenured judges are is a matter of great
political moment for this nation, and to alter the level of conflict would
require a change in the underlying political dynamics of which
nomination fights are expressive.
But identifying that decisions on judgeships as events of political
moment does not result in a conclusion that current processes produce a
particularly useful form of political exchange. 14 Thus, I outline a few
changes that could be made, including trying to increase senatorial
involvement by reliance on supermajority approval rules. Revisiting the
format of judicial office-holding is also necessary because of
democratic commitments to constrained and diffused power, with norm
production generated through dialogic processes. No one person
(judges included) ought to hold too much power for too long. To
reduce the power now held by the life-tenured, one could cushion the
impact of each individual selected, either by adding many more life-
tenured judgeships and/or by shortening the terms of service. To alter
the import of life tenure, Congress could create incentives for judges to
shorten their length of service and the Court could reread the meaning
of "good behavior" to sanction a term limit.
In Part VII, I consider the relevance of the experiences of the
United States to other countries. The U.S. federal system has developed
a very public politicized system with input from a range of
constituencies. In some Commonwealth countries, commentators decry
the lack of popular input into judicial selection. But when democracies
have other techniques for making appointments, or better specification
of the judicial role, or legal pre-commitments to certain kinds of judicial
selection processes 5 and other means of debating legal norms, one
would be hard pressed to advocate that they adopt practices like those
for the life-tenured judiciary in the United States. Turning
individuals-who have not yet taken their seats nor faced the particular
14 A summary of various proposals can be found in GERHARDT, supra note 13, at 290-339.
15 For example, the South African Constitution provides for a process for selection for the
constitutional court judges, in which a "judicial service commission" prepares lists of nominees
from which the president must appoint a person or obtain a supplemental submission from that
commission; the Constitution also specifies how commission members are to be selected. See S.
AFR. CONST. ch. 8, §§ 174, 178 (adopted 1996).
[Vol. 26:2
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legal and factual questions as they emerge through litigation-into
vehicles for debating the shape of social values is not the only nor
necessarily a good way to have such debates. Both the people and the
ideas become caricatures, and the peculiar decisionmaking processes of
adjudication, with its fact-full specificity, become lost.
My suggestion is that, when claims for change in selection
methods are made, one needs to focus on what kinds of problems are
prompting calls for change. For example, is the issue a lack of diversity
on a bench, as contrasted with a general malaise about government
power, as contrasted with a hope of gaining influence over nominations
to block individuals identified with certain visions of constitutional
rights? Revisions in procedures need to be driven by specific problems
and provided through tailored solutions. If concentrated prime
ministerial power is the problem, then the creation of commissions to
diffuse the screening and appointing powers may be useful. If a lack of
diversity is the basis for critique, then a commission to make selections
ought similarly to have obligations to look for diverse candidates and
itself be constituted to include diverse segments of a polity.
16
Generic calls for "transparency" and "accountability" sound
appealing but the application of those values in the context of judicial
appointments is cumbersome and often in tension with the very charter
to be a judge. Demands for "accountability" can result in worrisome
incursions on the aspirations for adjudication-that judges form
decisions based on a particular and peculiar process focused on specific
problems and influenced by a specific intersection of law, fact, and
context.
Indeed, the point of judicial independence is to render judges
immune from certain forms of political accountability. Moreover, given
that judges are insulated deliberately and often have charters longer than
the terms of office for most elected positions, 17 the electorate has a
16 See Judith Resnik, Composing a Judiciary: Reflections on Proposed Reforms in the United
Kingdom on How to Change the Voices and the Constituencies for Judging, in CONSTITUTIONAL
INNOVATION, supra note 2, at 228-53.
17 In the United States, the Constitution guarantees both life tenure to Article III judges and
that their salaries cannot be diminished during their term of service. Such judges may be
removed only through impeachment, a device that is rarely used. See Charles G. Geyh, Judicial
Independence, Judicial Accountability, and the Role of Constitutional Norms in Congressional
Regulation of the Courts, 78 IND. L.J. 153 (2003). The only other formal statutory mechanism-
aside from appellate review of lower court judgments-is to file a complaint against a judge,
handled through confidential processes within the federal judiciary. See Judicial Conduct and
Disability Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 372 et seq. (2000). See generally Richard L. Marcus, Who
Should Discipline Federal Judges, and How?, 149 F.R.D. 375 (1993) and notes 220-21 infra.
In addition, judges may be asked to recuse themselves from ruling on individual cases. In
2003, discussion of judicial disqualification and self-regulation became intense when Justice
Antonin Scalia participated in a case, Cheney v. United States District for the District of
Columbia, challenging Vice President Richard Cheney's refusal to produce discovery on the
contacts that he had while involved in the National Energy Policy Group. The recusal request
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challenging task of holding the appointing politicians "accountable." At
best, politicians seeking reelection can be challenged for appointing
jurists who are themselves unlikely to suffer any direct consequences.
Even if the issue of a politician's vote on a particular judge has
sufficient saliency to result in defeating that politician, the jurist often
remains in office. And, in those jurisdictions that do require judges to
stand for reelection or be subject to a reappointment process that entails
popular input, those processes are criticized precisely because they
permit popular retaliation against judges.
In contrast, understanding democracy as requiring that judicial
power be exercised in a transparent and dialogic manner is both possible
and useful. With the pressure from heavy dockets and the privatization
of process, judging in democracies is at risk of losing its public
dimension. 18 Over the past decades, adjudication in the United States
has become less transparent, as appellate courts deem a significant
percentage of their decisions "not for publication" and specify that a
ruling not be used as precedent, as more cases end through private
contracts divesting courts of jurisdiction, and as some courts permit
records to be sealed and agreements to be confidential. 19  Other
countries and transnational courts have taken steps-including televised
court hearings-to help ensure access to knowledge about the work of
judges. 20 The need for change within the United States is acute.
While democratic ordering does not impose a singular method for
judicial selection, being a judge within democratic governments ought
to entail a set of practices distinct from that of judging in nondemocratic
polities. Imposing obligations on judges to do much of their work in
venues accessible to the public and to describe their reasons to the
turned on the contacts between Justice Scalia and the Vice President. See Cheney v. United
States District Court for the District of Columbia, 124 S. Ct. 1391 (2004) (providing the ruling of
Justice Scalia, sitting solely, and denying the motion). As an oblique response, Chief Justice
Rehnquist appointed a commission to study that system. See Mike Allen & Brian Faler, Judicial
Discipline to be Examined: Rehnquist Names Panel in Response to Ethics Inquiries, WASH.
POST, May 26, 2004, at A2.
18 See generally Judith Resnik, Migrating, Morphing, and Vanishing: The Empirical and
Normative Puzzles of Declining Trial Rates in Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 783 (2004)
[hereinafter Resnik, Migrating, Morphing, and Vanishing].
19 See generally Penelope Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of Private Judging in
the U.S. Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1435 (2004); Symposium, Court Enforced Secrecy:
Formation, Debate, and Application of South Carolina's New Secrecy Rules, 55 S.C. L. REV. 711
et seq. (2004); Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 371 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that the
public and the press possess a qualified First Amendment right of access to docket sheets of
courts).
20 Further, some jurists have suggested revisiting the practices of opinion writing itself to
make courts' written rulings intelligible to a wider audience than those technically proficient in
legal terms. See Brenda Hale, A Supreme Court for the United Kingdom?, in CONSTITUTIONAL
INNOVATION, supra note 2, at 36, 44.
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public links the concepts of transparency and accountability to the acts
of power by the judge, duly selected.
II. THEORIZING JUDICIAL SELECTION IN DEMOCRACIES
A. Adjudication and Democracies
Consider first the idea of a democracy, a thick and rich concept
plainly capable of expression through a host of different institutional
mechanisms and designs. Democracy relies on core commitments to
governance by consent of the people whose voices are heard, to
governance respectful of the dignity of individuals, to governance
constrained by prior commitments to the rule of law, and to governance
made accountable by the openness of its processes. The translation of
those general commitments into practices has produced an array of
institutions, variously designed. Plainly, choices exist about the
methods by which to organize governments that preserve democratic
commitments to accountability, separated and limited powers,
transparent governance, and the protection of human rights.
A general presumption that runs through democratic countries is
that senior government officials are selected through elections with
procedures that vary in parliamentary and presidential systems. But to
date, the premise that a country is a democracy has not been equated
with a requirement that all senior government officials derive authority
through popular election. Rather, popular participation is often
attenuated, as elected representatives have the power (theorized as
delegated) to select many kinds of officials such as senior ministers or
cabinet officials, ambassadors, heads of agencies or other organs of
government, and judges. Constraint on that appointment authority
comes from the possibility that holders of that power will, through
periodic elections, obtain either the renewal or recall of their mandates.
Adjudication, a form of decisionmaking that antedated modem
democracies, is a regular feature of all contemporary democratic
systems. More than that, the fact that a country is a democracy drives
rights of access to courts and to the legal profession as well as rights to
judicial transparency and government accountability. 2' Democracies
spawn needs for adjudication as well as requirements that judges be
independent, impartial, and protected from retribution by public and
private actors.22
21 See Judith Resnik, Procedure's Projects, 23 CIv. JUST. Q. 273 (Adrian Zuckerman ed.,
Sweet and Maxwell Nov. 2004).
22 See Robert M. Howard & Henry F. Carey, Is an Independent Judiciary Necessary for
Democracy?, 87 JUDICATURE 284 (2004) (describing a multi-national study finding correlations
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But judges sit in an odd relationship to democracies' ordinary
dependence on periodic electoral approval to validate the continuing
exercise of power. Judges once served at the pleasure of the Crown and
lost their commissions with the demise of a ruler.23 Today the opposite
presumption has taken hold: that judges often have terms of office
longer than those of other governmental officials. The rationale for
providing judges with an unusual temporal charter rests on a particular
conception of their role. A judge is not understood as a delegatee of a
specific political administration but rather as a uniquely-charged
government official given the license to sit in judgment of the
government itself. Judges are supposed neither to be partisan nor loyal
in the conventional sense to the individuals or political party that
empowered them or to the government that pays their salaries. 24
Democracies rely on the independence of their judiciaries as a
consequence of democratic commitments (often but not always
embodied in written constitutions) to the rule of law, the protection of
individual liberties and to rights that, while agreed upon at very general
levels (such as human dignity, equality or forms of freedom), inspire
significant conflicts in practice. Thus, democracies require that judges
make rulings that are often unpopular in a variety of ways. One
measure of unpopularity is that a court's judgment would not likely be
approved by a vote of the people, were the issue put on a ballot at the
same time as the judicial decision is made. 25 Another measure of a
judgment's unpopularity is that neither the executive nor the legislature
between judicial independence and political rights). Theories of the utility of independent judges
come not only from those interested in the flourishing of human rights but also from those
concerned with the flourishing of markets. The World Bank, for example, has many programs
devoted to the rule of law as a mechanism for enabling economic development, and economists
have modeled how independent judges serve to mediate between conflicting interest groups. See
Maria Dakolias, Legal and Judicial Development: The Rule of Law in the Reform Process, 24
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 526 (2000); LEGAL AND JUDICIAL SECTOR ASSESSMENT MANUAL: ISSUES
ON LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM (The World Bank, Legal Vice Presidency, July 2002),
available at http://www4.worldbank.org/legal/leglr/publicationsmanual.htm.
23 See David Lemmings, The Independence of the Judiciary in Eighteenth Century England,
THE LIFE OF THE LAW: PROCEEDINGS OF THE TENTH BRITISH LEGAL HISTORY CONFERENCE 125
(1991) (discussing how, with parliamentary control, judges became increasingly involved in
seeking "supplementary places and honours"). By examining which individuals were actually
selected in Hanoverian England, Lemmings concluded that after the Act of Settlement, more
senior judges had closer ties to the governing party than had judges in earlier periods, and that
through such "politicisation," a good deal of control was imposed.
24 See Robert M. Cover, The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, 14 CAP. U. L. REV.
179 (1984) (analyzing the conflicts between judges and those who endow them with the power to
judge); Rosalie Silberman Abella, The Judicial Role in a Democratic State, 26 QUEEN'S L.J. 573
(2001).
25 As we in the United States have seen many times, what is at one time unpopular (at least in
some parts of the country) but pronounced required by constitutional right becomes, in later
years, understood as intrinsic to the values and identity of the United States. Examples include
the role played by courts in changing views on the propriety and legality of subordination based
on race and sex.
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would be willing to take the political heat entailed in making it, for
persons identified with such a judgment would not likely retain office.
Unpopularity can also be gauged by whether an issue is of sufficient
moment that it can be used by politicians, as well as members of
corporate, religious, ethnic, or other kinds of groups, as grounds for
protest and mobilization.
In addition, adjudication is intrinsically unpopular - at least at a
very local level, for it determines which disputants prevail, in fact and
in law, against opponents. While many judgments are also nuanced
compromises, they enlist the exercise of state power to impose remedies
ranging from the provision of money to the conferral of forms of status
to the confinement of individuals. Long ago, Professor Robert Cover
captured the force of juridical lawmaking by entitling an essay Violence
and the Word,26 and his shorthand remains apt.
As this elaboration of the ways in which judgments can be
controversial suggests, adjudication is a specially-situated aspect of
functioning democracies. Adjudication's ability to sit inside democratic
theory-sometimes functioning to override popular preferences and
will--depends in part on judicial fidelity to the constraints imposed
through adjudication's peculiar and specific methods. Adjudication's
oddly powerful effects are limited-again at the theoretical level27-by
a set of decisional processes requiring fact-based, record-contained
specificity, coupled with transparency and explanation. Further,
adjudication has a means of revision, for each judgment can be
reconsidered either through appellate processes or as doctrine is
reinterpreted or reversed in subsequent cases.
B. Selecting Judges in Democracies: Appointments and Elections
Democracies need adjudication to be legitimate, which in turn
requires that mechanisms for selecting judges be understood to be
legitimate. Some democracies have specified methods of judicial
selection in constitutions. The United States is an obvious example, as
Article III of the Constitution provides expressly for the President, with
the advice and consent of the Senate, to nominate federal judges.28
26 Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986).
27 See Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2005);
Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article III,
113 HARV. L. REV. 924 (2000) [hereinafter Resnik, Trial as Error]; Judith Resnik, Managerial
Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982) (all describing the increasingly informal modes of judicial
action).
28 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (providing that the President "shall nominate, and by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers
and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other offices of the United States").
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Judges so selected are guaranteed office "during good behavior" and
salaries that cannot be diminished. 29 An explanation from democratic
theory for this particular technique is that, by splitting the nomination
and confirmation authority across two political branches, judges so
appointed gain their legitimacy through being twice vetted and validated
by those whose authority stems from popular election. 30
Given democratic preferences for empowerment of leaders through
the popular will, judicial election-used in many states within the
United States-also nests easily inside democratic principles. However,
not only is election now unusual as a method of selecting judges but a
good deal of criticism centers on that technique. The fear is that the
quest for office distorts the job of a judge either because of the need to
make campaign promises or to seek campaign funds. 31
Yet historians of judicial elections trace the origins of that practice
to efforts to depoliticize the process. Leaders in many states opted for
elections because of concerns about the role that political patronage
played in judicial appointments. The shift to direct election was an
effort to escape the "politics" of appointments and to improve the
quality of those serving as judges,32 just as the shift away from election
is also argued as a necessary response to the "politics" of elections and a
quest for the qualified. As discussed above, while democracies
generally rely on politic expressions of support for legitimacy, they seek
to fence judges off-to make them "independent" from--certain forms
of politics. The anxiety occasioned by overt judicial engagement in
"the political" seeps over to judicial selection. The reliance on
29 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (providing that the "Judges, both of the supreme and inferior
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for
their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in
Office").
30 More challenging for democratic theory is the exclusive investment of the power in Article
III judges to appoint other judges. As I detail below, Congress has given life-tenured
constitutional judges the authority to appoint statutory judges who serve for fixed and renewable
terms and whose numbers parallel those of the life-tenured trial bench. See infra Part III and
Judith Resnik, "Uncle Sam Modernizes His Justice": Inventing the District Courts for the
District of Columbia and the Nation, 90 GEO. L.J. 607 (2002) [hereinafter Resnik, Inventing the
District Courts].
31 See Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of
Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689 (1995). Some states have attempted to structure the ways in which
judges run for office. In 2002, the United States Supreme Court, in a decision divided five to
four, found one such regulation to be unconstitutionally restrictive of the freedom of speech. See
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
32 See Kermit Hall, Progressive Reform and the Decline of Democratic Accountability: The
Popular Election of State Supreme Court Judges, 1850-1920, 1984 A.B.A. RES. F.J. 345, 347-48
(1984) (concluding that the turn to elections for judges was driven by "constitutionally moderate
lawyers and judges," some of whom saw elections as a means of enabling judiciaries to have
legitimacy that would enhance their independence); see also Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The
People's Court: Party, Race, Class and the Rise of the American Elected Judiciary (2004)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
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appointment and on election of judges in democracies have both been
justified as techniques limiting politicalization, just as both techniques
are criticized for being too political. What I will argue below is that
when selecting life-tenured judges who are long-tenured (as in the
United States), a "political" appointment process is sensible and ought
to be embraced unapologetically but that other jurisdictions need not
emulate that approach.
Further, "politics" resides in all techniques but the form that
politics takes varies. As Professor Andrew Hanssen has identified, the
waves of reform can be understood as successive responses to ongoing
(and possibly unresolvable) agency problems. 33  At the country's
founding, state legislators (then seen as "heroes of the American
Revolution") were vested with significant power over judicial
appointments. 34 When legislators lost some of that sheen, interest in
insulating judges from legislative control grew. Direct election was one
response, illustrative of the commitment to popular sovereignty,
35 while
nonpartisan elections and merit plans (both developments of the later
part of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries) reflected an enthusiasm
for "scientific" or "expert" opinion.
36
Moreover, although appointment and election are often portrayed
as alternatives, both rubrics include significant variations and some
overlap. In some democracies, a prime minister or governor may hold
an exclusive power of appointment, while in other instances that power
is shared in law and fact by many political actors. Sometimes, the
power is delegated-more or less completely-to special boards or
commissions, constituted by political or by professional organizations.
37
Similarly, judicial elections vary as to whether they are non-partisan,
whether campaign financing and campaign speech are circumscribed,
and whether election comes as a confirmation or retention of a
particular jurist, serving initially through appointment. 38 The length of
33 See F. Andrew Hanssen, Learning about Judicial Independence: Institutional Change in
the State Courts, 33 J. LEG. STUD. 431 (2004).
34 Id. at 440.
35 Id. at 445-49.
36 Id. at 449-53.
37 See American Judicature Society, Judicial Selection in the States, at http://www.ajs.org/js.
For discussion of the system in place and changes proposed in England, see Kate Malleson,
Modernising the Constitution: Completing the Unfinished Business, in CONSTITUTIONAL
INNOVATION, supra note 2, at 119-33.
38 See generally Philip L. Dubois, Accountability, Independence, and the Selection of State
Judges: The Role of Popular Judicial Elections, 40 SW. L.J. 31 (1986). An interesting example
comes from Alaska which, as a late-entering state, could craft its processes after gaining
information about those of other states. Under the current rules, justices of the Supreme Court are
appointed through a process discussed infra notes 171-172. Thereafter they need to be
confirmed or rejected in the first "general election held more than three years after the judicial
appointment," and then subject to approval or rejection every tenth year. Canons and
commentary detail the kind of information that may be provided and that justices may only
595
HeinOnline -- 26 Cardozo L. Rev.  595 2004-2005
CARDOZO LA W REVIEW
time for which judges serve is another important variable.
This brief overview of the practices of different systems and the
changes over time within systems illustrates the array of techniques for
selection in countries all styled as democratic. One could embrace such
variation as all fair expressions of democratic values but also make
critical assessments as to how particular processes are used in a given
country. For example, the United States Constitution obliges
presidential nomination and senatorial confirmation but specifies no
more, spawning debates about what degree of "advice" the President
should seek and how substantive the Senate's role should be.4 ° One
could reason that the constitutional designation of a two-branch exercise
should oblige a cooperative sharing of the power of judicial selection.
Alternatively, one could claim a greater presidential power in law or
fact, derived from the agenda-setting power of nomination. Or, as Mark
Tushnet proposed in an exchange before a Senate subcommittee,
because the Senate's electoral mandate is renewed when some of its
members are elected during the four-year interval when a president is in
office, deference to the Senate could be, in theory, more democratically
appropriate. 40
In contrast to the various theoretical options for using the power
constitutionally specified, the history of actual selections of life-tenuredjudges in the United States is one of presidential supremacy and regular
conflict. Since this country's inception, people in the United States
have disagreed about the scope of national powers and about the
desirability of an expansive role for federal adjudication. In the United
States, the two dominant parties (now and in earlier eras) have been
distinguished (in part) by their differing views about the meaning of
constitutional guarantees and of constitutional allocations of powers to
different institutions of government. States' rights, federal power, andjudicial selection are interrelated sites of contestation. One way to
display disagreement is through judicial selections. Politicians have
engage in "overt political activity" if "active opposition" to their candidacy exists. See ALASKA
STAT. § 15.35.030; ALASKA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 5(c)(3) (2004-2005).
39 See Charles L. Black, Jr., A Note on Senatorial Consideration of Supreme Court Nominees,
79 YALE L.J. 657, 664 (1970); David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, the
Constitution, and the Confirmation Process, 101 YALE L.J. 1491 (1992); infra note 184 and
accompanying text.
40 See The Senate's Role in the Nomination and Confirmation Process: Whose Burden?,
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts, Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 107th Cong. 197, 198 (2001) (statement of Mark Tushnet, Professor, Georgetown
University School of Law) [hereinafter Tushnet Testimony, 2001] (arguing that the President
"presumptively has the support of the people.., as a whole, having been chosen by a majority of
them. Senators can reasonably respond that they too were chosen by a majority of the American
people taken as a whole. Indeed, they can note that [unlike the single moment in time of a
presidential election], Senators were chosen in a series of elections that, taken together, might
better capture the more enduring values of the American people"), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/oldsite/te09O4Ol so-tushnet.htm.
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learned to use judicial nominations-and the names of particular
nominees or sitting jurists-as signals to constituencies about their
stances on a range of issues.
C. New Democratic Concerns and New Legitimating Practices:
Diversity and Constraints on Judicial Power
Over recent decades in the United States and elsewhere, judicial
selection processes have begun to intersect with an emergent theme in
democratic theory-that all kinds of people are entitled to participate as
political equals and that access to judgeships ought to be more fairly
distributed across groups of aspirants. In eras when only men had
juridical authority and in countries in which only whites had legal
standing, judges were drawn exclusively from those pools. In the
contemporary world, where democratic commitments oblige equal
access to power by persons of all colors whatever their identities, the
composition of a judiciary-if all-white or all-male or all-upper class-
becomes a problem of equality and legitimacy. 41  In short, that
democracy does not impose a particular selection system on a country
does not decide the legitimacy of particular processes if proven to be
systematically unfair to identifiable segments of a polity.
Given the history of exclusion, diversity has recently become a
dimension of contemporary selection concerns, worldwide. Judicial
selection processes have come to address various demographic
characteristics of a polity as they focus on individuals to serve as
judges. For example, by statute, Canada has a set-aside to ensure that
its highest court includes three justices from Quebec and hence has
experts on the civil law, as well as some justices likely to be
francophones. 42  Conventions have also developed in Canada that
assume some geographical diversity, with more justices coming from
the provinces with the highest populations than from other provinces.
43
Similarly, the Treaty of Rome that created the International
41 Jane Mansbridge, The Descriptive Political Representation of Gender: An Anti-Essentialist
Argument, in HAS LIBERALISM FAILED WOMEN?: ASSURING EQUAL REPRESENTATION IN
EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 19-38 (Jytte Klausen & Charles S. Maier eds., 2001).
42 See Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., ch. S-19, § 6 (1985) (Can.).
43 The expectation is that three of the Supreme Court judges come from the Province of
Ontario, with one coming from the Western and Northern Provinces and the other from the
Maritimes. On the current court, with the appointments made in August of 2004, two judges
from Ontario-Rosalie Abella and Louise Charron-were appointed to replace two-Frank
tacobucci and Louise Arbour-departing from Ontario. Coming from Quebec are Morris Fish,
Marie Deschamps, and Louis LeBel. The Right Honorable Beverly McLachlin comes from
British Columbia, Justice John Major from Alberta, Justice Michel Basarache from New
Brunswick, and Justice William Ian Cornell Binnie from Ontario. See About the Supreme Court
of Canada, available at http://www.scc.csc.ga.ca/AboutCourt/judges/curudges-e.asp.
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Criminal Court calls for countries nominating judges to "take into
account" that among the judges serving should be individuals expert in
either criminal law or relevant bodies of international law, that those
selected provide "representation of the principal legal systems of the
world," "equitable geographical representation," and "a fair
representation of female and male judges." 44 Moving inside the United
States, the Constitution of Alaska requires that a Judicial Council solicit
and screen applicants and that consideration be given to "area
representation. '45
Concerns about a judiciary's demographics can also focus on a
particular court at a particular moment in time and prompt a search for
individuals who add to the skill set of those already sitting. For
example, some commentators believe the United States Supreme Court
would benefit from the addition of jurists whose professional
backgrounds include service in elected national or state political offices
or as trial attorneys, while others believe that all candidates should be
culled from lower court benches.46
Specifying criteria for judges in addition to diversity would also
seem a helpful step to guide decisionmakers. Some countries, for
example, require that candidates for judgeships be of a certain age or
have had specific kinds of professional training. But, in practice, many
criteria are either at a level of generality rendering them minimally
illuminating and constraining (i.e., professional experience,
competence, integrity) or at a level of specificity making them plainly
political (i.e., adherence to beliefs supportive or hostile to a particular
44 See Art. 36(8)(a) of the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (entered into force July 1, 2002). The Treaty requires that the Court
consist of at least eighteen judges, see id. at Art. 36(1), with no two being "nationals of the same
State." Id. at Art. 36(7). Article 36(3) calls on state parties to nominate persons either with
"established competence in criminal law and procedure" or with "established competence in
relevant areas of international law such as humanitarian law and the law of human rights."
Nominees are then put onto two lists, representing criminal law and international law (a nominee
can be listed on both). Id. at Art. 36(5). Then, the "Assembly of State Parties" makes selections
through secret ballots. Id. at Art. 36(6). In addition to calling on state parties to take into account
the need for "fair representation of female and male judges," the Treaty also calls for taking into
account the need for judges with "legal expertise on... violence against women or children." But
no enforcement mechanism is specified. See generally Cate Steins, Gender Issues, in THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 357-90 (Roy S. Lee
ed., 1999).
45 ALASKA CONST. art. 4, §§ 5, 8.
46 See Tushnet Testimony, 2001, supra note 40. As a factual matter, political scientists have
mapped the increased role that holding a circuit judgeship plays. See Epstein, Knight, &
Shvetsova, supra note 3, at 21, tbl. 2 (Prior Legal Experience of Associate Justices of the U.S.
Supreme Court, 1900-2001); Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Andrew D. Martin, The Norm of Prior
Judicial Experience and Its Consequences for Career Diversity on the US. Supreme Court, 91
CAL. L. REV. 903 (2003). The need for what he terms "career diversity" is discussed by James
Julius Brudney in Foreseeing Greatness? Measurable Performance Criteria and the Selection of
Supreme Court Justices, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005), available at http://papers
.ssrn.com/paper/abstract/id=62581.
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right, such as abortion). The challenge of describing criteria stems in
part because, as "with any job, the job description logically precedes the
determination of the qualification." 47  The conflict over who should
judge, the criteria for judges, and how to pick judges mirrors the
conflict over what the job of the judge should be.
Another question is whether the nature of judicial power in a
particular country affects analyses of or preferences for kinds of judicial
selection or, conversely, whether given particular kinds of selection
processes, judicial authority ought to be circumscribed. Courts vary in
terms of the breadth of their jurisdiction. In addition, in those countries
with courts having the power of judicial review of legislation, practices
also vary in terms of the import of the exercise of that authority. For
example, in Canada, the 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides
for the possibility of a parliamentary or a provincial legislative override
of certain judicial decisions, albeit with a five-year sunset clause absent
re-enactment of that override. 48 Such a limitation on judicial power
may both generate a more cooperative relationship between branches of
government and provides a buffer to the impact of judicial selection
decisions.
In contrast, in the United States, a legislative override is not seen
as generally available,49 and the scope of legislative power is itself a
current subject of debate.50 Further, some complain that the democratic
imprimatur of selection through the two political branches is insufficient
to support innovative exercises of federal judicial power. A shorthand
sometimes used is the phrase "the counter-majoritarian difficulty.
' 51
47 Frederick Schauer, Judging in a Corner, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1717, 1732 (1988).
48 See CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Charter of Rights and Freedoms), § 33
(providing that either the Parliament or a legislature of a province "may expressly declare in an
Act of Parliament or of the legislature ... that the Act or a provision ... shall operate
notwithstanding" the other rights guaranteed under section 2 ("Fundamental Freedoms"), sections
7-15 (Legal Rights and Equality Rights) of the Charter). Thus, implicitly, a court's declaration of
invalidity would be trumped for five-year periods, that could be extended through affirmative
reenactment of legislation. This override does not apply to certain Charter Rights, including
"Democratic Rights," "Mobility Rights," and language and educational rights.
49 See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Larry Kramer, The Supreme Court
2000 Term: Foreword, We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2001).
50 See generally Robert C. Post & Reva Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section
Five Power: Policentric Interpretations of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J.
1943 (2003); Judith Resnik, Tribes, Wars, and the Federal Courts: Applying the Myths and
Methods of Marbury v. Madison to Tribal Courts' Criminal Jurisdiction, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 77
(2004); Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional
Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975).
51 See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1986); Barry
Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty, Part Five: The Birth of an Academic Obsession, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002); Barry
Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial
Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333 (1998); Louis Michael Seidman, Ambivalence and
Accountability, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1571 (1988).
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Although the impulse might then be to require majoritarian
approval of judicial decisions, as John Hart Ely explained in Democracy
and Distrust, "a majority with untrammeled power to set government
policy is in a position to deal itself benefits at the expense of the
remaining minority even when there is no relevant difference between
the two groups. '52  Constitutional precommitments serve "those
situations where representative government cannot be trusted, not those
where we know it can."' 53 Underlying challenges to judicial authority
rest less on how judges are selected and more on the fact that they arejudges-rendering decisions on major questions of legal, political,
economic, and social policy in the context of individual cases.
As I hope this discussion has made plain, skepticism about
universal answers to questions of judicial selection is in order, both in
terms of prescriptions that cross the borders of different countries and
those that purport to endure for long periods of time within one country.
While the need for independent judges has become a universal artifact
of democracies and concerns about the role and accountability of judges
are similarly shared, the ways to choose judges vary considerably.5 4
Contexts-countries' cultures, histories, legal commitments,
institutional arrangements, and political party structure-may prompt
different answers both across jurisdictions and over time.55 While a
democracy may exclude certain selection methods-such as inheritance
or selection of judges exclusively under the control of unelected
individuals-being a democracy dictates less than might be expected
about methodologies for judicial selection.
52 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 7 (1980).
53 Id. at 183. Professor Ely there proceeded to develop a theory of judicial review limited to
"representation reinforming" judgments, such that the check provided by the Supreme Court
when considering the "Constitution's open-ended provisions" would be to "concern itself only
with questions of participation, and not with the substantive merits of the political choice under
attack." Id at 181.
54 See Ruth Gavison, The Implications of Jurisprudential Theories for Judicial Election,Selection, and Accountability, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1617, 1661 (1988). Professor Louis Michael
Seidman argued the utility of a diversity of arrangements. "Elected judges will behave differently
from judges who are appointed but subject to popular recall, and both will behave differentlyfrom judges appointed with life tenure .... [T]hese techniques create different contexts that bring
to the fore different values, all of which 'we' adhere to in the appropriate setting." Seidman,
supra note 51, at 1599-1600.
55 As the history of selection of judges at the state level illustrates, an appointment process
was replaced by electoral processes to divest parties of the powers of patronage, and then
electoral processes were replaced by appointment processes to divest sophisticated repeat players
from dominating electoral results. See Hall, Progressive Reform and the Decline of Democratic
Accountability, supra note 32; see also Hanssen, supra note 33, at 465 (concluding that "each
new procedure developed in attempt to shelter state judges from the influence of incumbent
political officials in the other branches (and the forces they represent) and were inspired in largepart by revisions in understandings of the agency problems involved"). Professor Hanssen also
noted that those interested in changing state selection practices have not embraced the life-tenured
model of the federal system. He speculated that state bar associations, a major source of change,
had little interest in a process that would so diminish their influence. Id. at 467-69.
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II. SUPPLYING NEW KINDS OF JUDGES TO MEET THE DEMAND
A. A Singular Form of Federal Judgeship: The Article II Judge
Moving from theory to the context of the United States, in this
section I examine the different methods of judicial selection that have
developed over the last century within the federal system. Although
popular debate often assumes Presidential nomination on the federal
side and elections on the states' side, the techniques for appointment are
more varied.
Some federal judges get their charters through the constitutional
processes that compel so much attention. But hundreds of other federal
judges are appointed through different kinds of selection processes.
Indeed, given the proliferation of kinds of federal judgeships and
methods of selection, the use of some common terms needs
clarification. The first, and most visible in and outside of the United
States, are Article III judges or constitutional judges, so described
because it is Article III of the United States Constitution that protects
judicial independence through guarantees of life tenure and of salaries
that cannot be diminished.
About one hundred years ago, in 1901, one could have stopped the
discussion of methods of federal judicial selection there. About one
hundred life-tenured judges sat working on behalf of the national
government in the entire United States. For those familiar with the
current landscape of federal adjudication, with more than thirty trial-
level federal judges sitting in some districts, it may be hard to imagine a
federal court system in which a single district judge served an entire
state. But in 1901, in states such as Indiana, Maryland, and
Massachusetts, one federal judge did just that.56
The picture is very different today, as Congress has repeatedly
authorized new life-tenured judgeships. As of 2001, Congress had
created more than 850 slots, resulting in an eightfold increase. The
expansion of the ranks of the life-tenured (illustrated below in Chart 1,
Article III Authorized Judgeships: District, Circuit, and Supreme
Courts, 1901, 1950, 2001) 57 presents new strategic opportunities for
56 See, e.g., 220 F. v-vii (1915) (listing the district judges and their assignments).
57 Note that this is a count of "authorized judgeships" rather than of persons currently sitting
as judges. Under United States law, Article III judges may take "senior status" after a certain age
or a certain number of years in service, receive their salary, and reduce their case load. See 28
U.S.C. § 371 (2000). In addition, they receive favorable tax treatment. See 28 U.S.C. § 3121
(2000). According to recent data, about forty percent of all current sitting federal judges are such
senior status judges. See Albert Yoon, As You Like It: Senior Federal Judges and the Political
Economy of Judicial Tenure, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2005) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Yoon, Senior Federal Judges].
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presidents seeking to make a long-term mark on the interpretation of
federal law.
Chart 1 Article III Authorized Judgeships: District, Circuit and









1901 (Total 1950 (Total 2001 (Total
Judgeships: 107) Judgeships: 286) Judgeships: 853)
0 District Court M Court of Appeals E3 Supreme Court
B. Pressures for More: Demanding Justice
The federal district courts as we think of them today are an artifact
of the twentieth century, during which ideas about who had what rights
to courts changed radically. The increase in Article III judgeships is
one of several examples of efforts to respond to the growing demand for
judges. During the twentieth century, different political conceptions of
people, of governments, and of markets, working in combination with
changing technologies, altered the expectations about when courts ought
to be made available and about who ought to be able to use them.
Simply put, the prospect of adjudication became plausible for whole
new sets of claimants.
Four factors are central to the rising demand for adjudication that
has in turn changed the context in which judging takes place and driven
the need to multiply the methods used to select judges. First,
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individuals gained new rights to use litigation to call state officials to
account and to hold government to its own promises. 58 The idea that
certain forms of government activities bestowed "mere privileges" gave
way to a broader understanding that obligations of government specified
in the Constitution and programs instituted by government were
themselves sources of individual rights. Some claims, such as those
involving constitutional rights, are highly visible, prompting press
coverage and social conflict about the judgments rendered. Many more
involve ordinary transactions. For example, the United States
government has waived its immunity for many kinds of tort actions
59
and for a variety of contract claims. 60 The government has also set up
adjudicatory mechanisms by which individuals can contest the amount
of benefits provided to them under various programs, such as those for
veterans and social security recipients.
61
Further, Congress has authorized individuals or entities aggrieved
by agency action to bring claims against federal agencies. 62 To process
more disputes, Congress revamped the Court of Federal Claims,
63
created other adjudicatory structures, and expanded the Article III
judiciary. Through such legislation, the government has obligated itself
to make good on its own contracts, to pay for certain tortious injuries, to
enable people to disagree with its award of federal benefits and, in some
instances, to challenge decisions made by regulators. 64
Second, increasing demand comes from the private sector through
its reliance on the rule of law. Aided by information technologies that
were developed during the twentieth century, the networking across
58 See generally Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty, Immunity,
and Judicial Independence, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L. L. REv. 521 (2003); Judith Resnik & Julie
Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the Role of Dignity in Conceptions of
Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1921 (2003).
59 See Federal Torts Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346, § 2671 et seq. (2000) (enacted in 1946).
The statute includes some specific requirements (such as exhausting administrative remedies and
limiting attorneys fees and forms of damages) and exempts certain kinds of conduct from forming
the basis for liability. On the history and legal bases for federal immunity from suit, see Jackson,
Suing the Federal Government, supra note 58.
60 The creation of a mechanism to sue the federal government in contract stems from
practices developed during the nineteenth century. See Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat.
612 (1855) (codified as the Tucker Act, at 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2000)) (providing for what was then
called the Court of Claims and is now called the Court of Federal Claims).
61 See generally Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 76-379, 53 Stat. 1360 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 405 (2000)); Department of Veterans Affairs Codification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-83,
105 Stat. 378 (1991) (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 511 (2000)).
62 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559; 701-709 (2000) (enacted in 1946).
63 See generally Steven L. Schooner, The Future: Scrutinizing the Empirical Case for the
Court of Federal Claims, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 714 (2003); Judith Resnik, Of Courts, Agencies
and the Federal Court of Claims: Happily Outliving One's Anomalous Character, 71 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 798 (2003).
64 In other countries, some provisions for remedies against governments exceed those of the
United States. See James E. Pfander, Government Accountability in Europe: A Comparative
Assessment, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 611 (2003).
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physical boundaries has enlarged the scope of operations of both public
and private entities. Many forms of injury became identifiable as
suffered by large numbers of individuals. When made visible, such
patterns of connected events (such as the harms from toxic chemicals,
from mismanaged funds, or from segregated schools) prompted interest
in aggregate means to process claims of wrongdoing and to remedy
them. While once the presumption had been that a lawsuit involved two
individuals in conflict, current dockets are dotted with aggregate claims,
sometimes through class actions or other formal mechanisms (such as
statutes providing for consolidation of multi-district cases) and other
times through informal means.65
This second factor interacted with a third-the growth of the legal
profession, which has provided the personnel to generate regulations
and responses to the many claims of right.66 Law as an organizing
premise in the United States is now so well entrenched that we
sometimes forget that most of the prominent institutions of the law in
the United States were created during the end of the nineteenth and in
the twentieth century. Formal legal education in the United States took
its current shape only within the last hundred years. 67 The American
Bar Association dates from the late nineteenth century,68 and the
American Law Institute from the 1920s.69 Government support for
financing some lawyers to enable access to courts is yet more recent,
coming in 1974 through federal legislation creating the Legal Services
Corporation. 70 Until relatively recently, the legal profession itself was
closed to persons of different religions, ethnicities, races, and gender.
For example, not until the 1970s did law schools began to admit women
in significant numbers (i.e., more than twenty percent of entering
classes). 71
A fourth factor, one often under-appreciated in the literature of
courts, is the change in the understanding of which persons can be
65 See generally Judith Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation, "54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 5
(1991).
66 See generally RICHARD L. ABEL & PHILLIP S.C. LEWIS, LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: AN
OVERVIEW (1995); Stephen C. Yeazell, Re-Financing Civil Litigation, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 183
(2001).
67 ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO
THE 1980s (1990).
68 The ABA was founded in 1878. See History of the ABA, at http://www.abanet.org/media/
profile.html.
69 The ALl was founded in 1923. See About the American Law Institute, at http://www.ali.
org/ali/thisali.htm.
70 Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-355, 88 Stat. 378 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2996 et seq. (2000)).
71 See generally Deborah R. Hensler & Judith Resnik, Contested Identities: Task Forces on
Gender, Race, and Ethnic Bias and the Obligations of the Legal Profession, in THE ETHICS IN
PRACTICE: LAWYERS' ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION (Deborah L. Rhode ed.,
2000).
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rightsholders. Women only gained juridical voice in the last century,
and the radical reconception of women as rights-holders (both inside
and outside of their families) 72 has driven up the volume of disputes.
When one adds women of all colors to other persons now recognized as
rights-holders---children, prisoners, the disabled, persons of various
colors and ethnicities--one can see the many bases that have caused the
demand side for justice to grow, as democratic principles mandate
transparency in government interactions to enable accountability and
also require forms of regulation over privately-held power to ensure its
constraint.
New rights to adjudication necessarily affect the question of
judicial selection. More judges-of different types-are needed to staff
a growing number of courts. Democratic principles both produce rights
of access of all persons to courts and endow all persons with rights to
participate in different roles within courts-from litigant to lawyer to
witness to juror to security staff, administrative clerk, and judge. Not
surprisingly, governments around the world have responded by
multiplying both the number of judges and the venues for adjudication
and by reviewing their means of appointing jurists. These new demands
for judging have prompted new questions about how to organize, how
to staff, and how to appoint judiciaries.
C. More Federal Judges, Differently Selected: Magistrate,
Bankruptcy, and Administrative Law Judges
In the United States, those questions have been answered by
augmenting the ranks of federal jurists through creating judgeships
beyond those described in Article III of the United States Constitution
and through methods other than those specified in Articles II and III.
As a result, even with an eightfold increase in life-tenured federal
judges over a century, Article III judges comprise only about a quarter
of the federal judicial workforce. Three other sets of judges, some in
Article III courts and others in administrative agencies, complete the
picture of federal adjudicators.
Consider first magistrate and bankruptcy judges, who also sit in the
more than 550 federal courthouses in the United States. These judges
do not have life tenure. Rather, through enactments in 1968 and in
72 See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Reconstructing Equality: Of Justice, Justicia, and the Gender of
Jurisdiction, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMiNISM 393 (2002); Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The
Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947
(2002); Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, Feminism and International Law: An Opportunity for
Transformation, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 345 (2002); Vicki C. Jackson, Gender and
Transnational Discourse, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 377 (2002).
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1984, Congress created these new categories of what I term statutory
judges and stipulated their method of selection and their terms of office.
Article III judges at the trial level, district by district, appoint magistrate
judges who serve for eight-year renewable terms. The number of
magistrate slots is decided by the Judicial Conference of the United
States (consisting of twenty-seven Article III judges and serving as the
policy-making body of the federal courts73), as long as it can allocate
funds to pay for their judgeships. The twelve appellate courts that
govern geographically-delineated circuits have the power to appoint
bankruptcy judges, who serve for fourteen-year renewable terms.
Congress has retained its power to decide directly the number of such
judgeships, just as it does for life-tenured district and appellate
judgeships.
Turn then to Chart 2, Authorized Trial Level Federal Judgeships in
Article III Courts, Nationwide, 2001, below.
Chart 2 Authorized Trial Level Federal Judgeships in Article III
Courts, Nationwide, 2001
Art. ll: District Court, Magistrate & Bankruptcy
Life-Tenured Judgeships Judgeships
* Article M District Court (665)
* Magistrate: Full-Time (471)
* Magistrate: Combination (3)
El Bankruptcy (324)
0 Magistrate: Part-Time (59)
73 See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2000); Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist
Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223, 272-91 (2003) (discussing the history
of the Judicial Conference and its practices over the past eighty years) [hereinafter Resnik,
Constricting Remedies].
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As the bar graphs illustrate, more than 450 full-time magistrate and
about 325 bankruptcy judges join district judges at the trial level. As a
consequence, the statutory federal judgeships now outnumber the
judgeships allotted for their constitutional, Article III siblings.74 Indeed,
as of 2000, in six district courts, the number of authorized positions for
magistrate judges was greater than that for life-tenured judges. 75 In
another sixteen, their numbers were equal.
Constitutional judges are thus responsible for the selection,
appointment, and reappointment of more than 700 statutory judges.
Those chosen to be constitutional judges therefore not only shape the
law through adjudication; they also shape the law by deciding who will
serve as our statutory judges. As to the methods of selection, the
authorizing statute for magistrate judges does specify a few
requirements when district judges make appointments, whereas the
statute providing for circuit courts to appoint bankruptcy judges does
not.76  For example, Congress has required that candidates for
magistrate judgeships have a certain number of years of lawyering
experience. Further, district courts are to use "merit selection panels,"
to be "composed of residents of the individual districts, to assist the
courts in identifying and recommending persons best qualified to fill
such positions. '77 In 1979, Congress also called for the merit selection
panels to give "due consideration to all qualified individuals, especially
such groups as women, blacks, Hispanics, and other minorities.
78
In addition, the Judicial Conference of the United States has
promulgated guidelines for both the appointment and the reappointment
of magistrate judges. 79 Nonetheless, the structure varies somewhat from
district to district, and the final decision on selection rests with the life-
tenured judges of each district court. A large percentage of magistrate
judges are reappointed, again by virtue of decisionmaking by the life-
tenured judges with whom magistrate judges work in their particular
districts. Courts of appeals, statutorily-charged to select bankruptcy
judges, do so without a requirement of using any particular screening
74 As noted, the counting is made more complex through the role played by senior judges as
well as by vacancies in the authorized judgeships slots. See Yoon, Senior Federal Judges, supra
note 57. Similarly, bankruptcy and magistrate judges may be "recalled" to serve, so that the
number of persons actually working generally exceeds the number of officially-allocated lines.
75 As of January 2000, those districts were the Middle and Southern Districts of Alabama, the
Western District of New York, the Eastern and Southern Districts of California, and the Western
District of Texas. Telephone interview with staff, Magistrates Division, Administrative Office of
the U.S. Courts (Jan. 9, 2001).
76 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 631 (2000) (magistrate judicial selection) with 28 U.S.C. § 152
(2000) (bankruptcy judicial selection).
77 See 28 U.S.C. § 631(b) (2000).
78 See Federal Magistrates Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-82, §3(c), (e), 93 Stat. 643, 644-45.
79 See Administrative Office of the United States Courts-Magistrate Judges Division, The
Selection and Appointment of United States Magistrate Judges (2002).
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device. 80  Again, the Judicial Conference has provided some
guidelines, 8' and again, some variation exists across the twelve circuits
that make such selections.
These statutory innovations have enlarged the pool of prospective
federal judges in two respects. First, Article III judges sometimes select
individuals to serve as magistrate and bankruptcy judges who, as a
political matter, would not have been promoted by any particular
senator, nominated by a President, nor approved by the Senate. Second,
a career ladder has developed, in that some individuals first serve in the
position of a statutory judge and are then able to obtain an Article III
judgeship.
Moreover, some argue that life-tenured judges have done a better
job than the politicians have in designing a selection process that is
more substantive and less onerous. 82 For example, Judicial Conference
regulations include a commitment to confidentiality of materials
submitted when individuals are considered for magistrate judgeships
and provide for public solicitation of nominees but not for public
hearings vetting those nominated. This selection process has attracted a
pool of many individuals interested in serving as judges, and the result
has been bankruptcy and magistrate benches replete with individuals of
great ability.
But this kind of selection process-vesting exclusive final
authority in life-tenured judges-is also problematic. While the career
ladder that has developed is not the equivalent of the European system,
it has started to have some parallels, raising concerns about the "bench
climber." Analysts of career judiciaries note that judges who sit at
lower levels and seek promotion or reappointment have incentives to
conform and to defer, that they tend to be cautious in an atmosphere in
which collegiality is a virtue and retaliation is feared.83 Whether judges
would use published opinions as a technique of identifying themselves
as candidates for promotion is a part of the concern. 84
Further, although life-tenured judges always had some powers of
80 See 28 U.S.C. § 152 (2000).
81 Regulations of the Judicial Conference of the United States for the Selection, Appointment,
and Reappointment of United States Bankruptcy Judges (as amended, September 2000 and again
in August of 2001). Some revisions were made after 2000 in light of objections (including two
lawsuits) from bankruptcy judges who felt mistreated during the reappointment process.
82 As one local legal paper has opined, "the Bankruptcy Court now has the best bench, top to
bottom, of any court in the City of Chicago." See In the Matter of Grabill, 967 F.2d 1152, 1160
(7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J., dissenting) (citing CHI. L. BULLETIN, Jan 13, 1992, at 2).
83 See, e.g., Nicohlas L. Georgakopoulos, Discretion in the Career and Recognition
Judiciary, 7 U. OF CHI. L. S. ROUNDTABLE 205 (2000).
84 See, e.g., Andrew P. Morriss, Michael Heise & Gregory C. Sisk, Signaling and Precedent
in Federal District Court Opinions, 13 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. (forthcoming 2005) (reviewing
decisions on the constitutionality of sentencing guidelines to identify whether judges use
publication of opinions strategically when opportunities for promotion exist).
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appointment (for clerks, clerical staff, and special masters), the recent
years are the first in which life-tenured judges play a pivotal
institutional role in choosing a large number of people to serve as the
initial adjudicators within the federal system. Given concerns about
democratic input, this system is troubling, as the statutes do not
systematize methods for public input nor require deference to the views
of any non-judges when appointments and reappointments are made.
An alternative would be to give judges ("experts" on the needs and
nature of the job) a role in but not exclusive control over the
appointments of other judges.
The exclusivity of control is of concern from other perspectives.
The more that judges have power over an array of decisions, the more
complex their role becomes. Economists and public choice theorists
have begun to spawn a literature exploring judicial self-interest. 85
Judges may feel the need for more staff and resources in their capacity
as jurists. When they also serve as employers, administrators, and
planners, they have yet other incentives to establish need for growth. In
addition, when judges have the power of appointment, they also have
the ability to bestow benefits, such as salaries, staff support,
courtrooms, chambers, committee assignments, and pensions.
Applicants and their supporters therefore have new reasons to court
judges. Historically, judicial patronage has been a problem, often
solved by moving powers of appointment from individual jurists or the
judiciary as a whole to public officials or committees.
Deciding how promotions and reappointments are made poses yet
harder questions about judicial independence, and the problems are not
limited to judges who need to get reappointed to the same position. In
the United States, appellate judges (of both the intermediate and highest
courts) are increasingly drawn from the ranks of lower court judges.
For example, of about 1,200 judges listed in a 2001 "almanac" of
federal judges, about one hundred had served in a lower federal judicial
position and then "moved up."'86 To the extent we value independent
judges, unafraid of encountering popular disapproval and free from
needing collegial approval, the possibility of promotion may undercut
the ability of judges to feel unfettered by personal interest when
rendering judgments. 87
85 See Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of Judicial
Behavior, 68 U. CINN. L. REV. 615 (2000) (bemoaning the lack of empiricism on judicial self-
interest); Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of Procedure,
23 J. LEG. STUD. 627 (1994); Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Thing
Everyone Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (1994).
86 See Resnik, Inventing the District Courts, supra note 30, at 671, n.281; see also Lee
Epstein, Knight, & Martin, supra note 46, at 903 (detailing the reliance on appellate courts as
pools for Supreme Court nominees).
87 Similarly, proposals to use criteria such as citation rates as indicators of "merit" create
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Further, when evaluating the records of sitting judges, what should
be taken into account? Should assessment be made of the track
records-for example, by soliciting information from litigants or by
reviewing decisions and reversal rates? Will lower level judges respond
by searching for supporters, by publishing little, and by keeping low
profiles? Automatic reappointment avoids those problems but then
results in a de facto tenured set of judges. A presumption, rather than a
promise, of reappointment-arguably in place in the United States for
our statutory federal judges-may mitigate the problems, but the bases
for rebutting that presumption have yet to be clearly articulated.
Moreover, some statutory judges report that they feel constrained
"to please" their superiors in order for that presumption to apply.88
Conflicts over these questions have emerged in the last few years, as the
numbers of judges eligible for reappointment has grown. One
bankruptcy judge has a pending lawsuit against a circuit for not
reappointing him, 89 and the Judicial Conference of the United States has
revised its guidelines as a buffer against such claims.
Some might argue that, while statutory judgeships are interesting
examples in the discussion of federal judicial selection, the judges
themselves ought not to be counted as "federal judges" because they
serve under the authority of Article III judges. That claim had more
power in the early part of the twentieth century, when the Supreme
Court was loath to permit too much devolution to administrative hearing
officers of what it termed the "essential attributes of judicial power" and
insisted on access to life-tenured jurists to reevaluate "jurisdictional
facts." 90 But by that century's end, the Court had reread the provisions
of Article III to enable the shift of significant amounts of federal
adjudicatory power to non-Article III judges. 91
The powers of the two sets of judges-constitutional and
statutory-are not yet identical but the trend over the decades is clear.
More and more devolution of power to statutory judges has been upheld
as the lines blur between statutory and constitutional judges serving
within Article III courts. Article III judges continue to have more
authority, in terms of finality of decision. Yet, in practice, magistrate
and bankruptcy judges make many decisions that are functionally final.
significant opportunities for promoting oneself and others. See generally Steven Gey & Jim
Rossi, Empirical Measures of Judicial Performance: An Introduction to the Symposium, 32 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005).
88 Resnik, Inventing the District Courts, supra note 30, at 671-75.
89 See Scholl v. United States, 61 Fed. Cl. 322 (2004) (denying a renewed motion by the
United States to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and holding that judicial review is
not foreclosed).
90 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
91 See, e.g., Commodities Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986). See
generally Resnik, Inventing the District Courts, supra note 30, at 622-44.
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Further, statutory judges share forms of authority that previously been
assumed to be the exclusive prerogatives of life-tenured constitutional
judges. For example, magistrates can preside, with parties' consent, at
civil trials. Both magistrate and bankruptcy judges have forms of
contempt powers, and bankruptcy judges sit in panels to provide
appellate review. When the quality of the power is coupled with the
volume of decisions (the bankruptcy docket exceeds a million filings
per year, and magistrate judges deal with thousands of matters, both
civil and criminal, annually), the authority of statutory judges becomes
clear. The reliance on bankruptcy and magistrate judgeships results in
the provision of significant federal adjudicatory resources outside the
constraints of the life-tenured, presidential nomination system.
My description of the federal judicial system in the United States is
not yet complete. In addition to the Article III courts, populated by
judges with and without life tenure, we have specially-created courts,
such as the Tax Court and the Court of Federal Claims, 92 that are often
called "Article I" courts because they are purely creatures of Congress.
Judges sitting on such courts are often presidential appointees but serve
for fixed terms, such as fifteen years.
Yet other judges who play an important role in federal adjudication
sit within federal agencies. Some of those decisionmakers, called
"administrative law judges" (ALJs) are commissioned under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).93 They are selected via a merit
selection board that reviews scores on competitive exams as well as
other factors, including a preference for veterans. 94 Once in office,
ALJs have some degree of protection because firing them is made
difficult through procedures requiring findings of cause. As Chart 3
(Authorized Federal Judgeships, Including Article I Courts and
Administrative Law Judges, Nationwide, Fall 2001) shows, more than
2000 individuals held such positions.
92 A symposium, prompted by the twentieth anniversary of the current version of this Court,
and devoted to analysis of it, can be found at 71 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 529-824 (2003).
93 Administrative Procedure Act, §§ 551-559, 701-709 (2000) (enacted in 1946).
94 Conflicts have arisen about this process. See Meeker v. Merit Systems Protection Board,
319 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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Chart 3 Authorized Federal Judgeships, Including Article I
Courts and Administrative Law Judges, Nationwide, Fall 2001
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That picture does not include all who might be counted, in that one
more set of adjudicators (called "administrative judges" or "hearing
officers") needs to be mentioned. These judges are not directly
chartered under the APA but rather are regular agency employees who
are assigned the job of judging.95
In terms of caseloads, about one third of a million cases are filed
95 See John H. Frye, III, Survey of Non-ALJ Hearing Programs in the Federal Government,
44 ADMIN. L. REV. 261, 349 (1992), as updated by Raymond Limon, Office of Administrative
Law Judges, The Federal Administrative Judiciary, Then and Now: A Decade of Change (Dec.
23, 2002). Professor Paul Verkuil calls such hearing officers the "real hidden judiciary." See
Paul R. Verkuil, Reflections on the Administrative Judiciary, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1345
(1992). Given their status as line employees, concerns about their independence have been raised
repeatedly, including for example, when Attorney General Ashcroft proposed to transfer some
immigration judges to other positions and to reduce the number of judges on the Board of
Immigration Appeals from eighteen to eleven. See Attorney General John Ashcroft, Remarks at a
News Conference on Administrative Change to Board of Immigration Appeals (Feb. 6, 2002).
Objections were made that such a move undercut the independence of those judges. See Role of
Immigration in the Department of Homeland Security Pursuant to H.R. 5005, The Homeland
Security Act of 2002: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security, House
Comm. on the Judiciary 107th Cong. 57 (2002) (statement of Dana Marks Keener, on behalf of
the National Association of Immigration Judges); Dana Marks Keener & Denise Noonan Slavin,
An Independent Immigration Court: An Idea Whose Time Has Come (Position Paper, 2003).
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annually in the federal trial courts.96 Estimates are that the docket of
federal agencies (such as those dealing with veterans, social security
beneficiaries, immigrants, and discrimination claimants) include about
the same number of cases, 97 and, as noted, bankruptcy judges have a
docket in excess of one million filings a year. In terms of adversarial
hearings and trials, federal agencies hold many more such proceedings
than do federal courts. About 10,000 civil and criminal trials are begun
annually in the federal courts.98 In contrast, I estimate that about three-
quarters of a million adversarial hearings are held annually in the four
federal agencies with high volume.99 One should further note that all of
the adjudication in the federal system is dwarfed by that occurring in the
states. Depending on how one counts and what is included, the numbers
range from 30 to 96 million case filings annually. 100 About 30,000
judges sit in the state courts, with about 350 serving on the highest
courts. 101
IV. ON TOP OF THE HIERARCHY-FOR LIFE
With all of these venues for adjudication, all of these cases, and all
of these judges, the people about whom one hears the most are those
who sit on top of this federal judicial hierarchy: Article III judges and
Supreme Court justices in particular. I hope that my thick description of
96 See generally ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, JUDICIAL
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 20 (2003), available at http//www.uscourts/gov/
judbus2003.contents.html [hereinafter JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS,
2003].
97 See Verkuil, supra note 95.
98 Counting is not straightforward because the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts codes as trials both those "proceedings resulting in jury verdicts or other final judgments
by the courts, as well as other contested hearings at which evidence is presented." See JUDICIAL
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 2003, supra note 96, at 20. Further, it is not clear
whether that database includes proceedings before magistrate judges as well as Article III judges.
See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 461, 474-76 (2004). Galanter concluded that
magistrate judges conducted 959 civil trials and bankruptcy judges 3,179 trials in 2002. Id. at
541, tbl. A-8, 559, tbl. A-21.
99 See Resnik, Migrating, Morphing, and Vanishing, supra note 19, at 800 fig. 2 (providing a
chart detailing those filings).
100 Counting questions emerge when considering whether or not to include traffic cases, civil
tort and contract disputes, and family law or juvenile cases. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE
COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS (2003), available at
http://www.ncsconline.org/DResearch/csp/2003Files/2003_Overview.pdf. Sixty percent of the
filings in the 96 million figure involved traffic cases. Id
101 In addition to the more than 350 judges on the courts of last resort, almost one thousand
judges serve on intermediate appellate courts, more than 11,000 on courts of general jurisdiction,
and almost 18,000 on courts of limited jurisdiction. See National Center for State Courts,
Jurisdiction and State Court Reporting Practices, at 36, available at http://www.ncsconline.org/
DResearch/csp/2003_files/2003_SCCSFigures.pdf.
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the contemporary federal judicial structure has begun to make plain how
unusual Article III judges are in the United States. Below, I examine
aspects of the distinctive nature of their authority.
A. Length of Service
One defining characteristic of an Article III judge is life tenure.
The purpose for this special charter is obvious. Current as well as
historical examples make plain that the drafters of the United States
Constitution were right to worry about the independence of judges and
to craft mechanisms for insulation. Whether the United States has done
enough is a matter of debate. For example, the American Bar
Association and some judges have repeatedly complained (and
sometimes brought lawsuits) arguing that federal judicial salaries are
too low and that the failure to raise salaries to meet increases in cost of
living is unlawful, punitive, and/or unwise. 10 2 Similar concerns have
been raised about judicial budgets, both state and federal. 10 3 Moreover,
as I have just mapped, many persons holding federal adjudicatory power
are not, under current doctrine, sheltered by the protections of Article
111.104
Further, the form of life tenure provided in the United States may
itself be a part of why selection of judges has become such a
battleground. Other democracies-seeking to achieve the same goal of
making judges secure in their service-have selected different means,
such as providing that their high court justices retire at a fixed age or
102 See American Bar Association and the Federal Bar Association, Federal Judicial Pay
Erosion: A Report on the Need for Reform (2001); Williams v. United States, 535 U.S. 911
(2002) (Breyer, J., joined by Justice Scalia and Kennedy, dissenting) (arguing in a class action
filed by judges that federal legislation that prevented automatic adjustments to increase pay for
judges in relationship to the cost of living violated Article III's non-diminution clause); see also
Patricia Manson, ABA to Study Ways to Protect Court Budgets, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Nov. 13,
2003, at Al (describing the formation of a commission to protect state judiciaries from funding
cuts limiting their capacity to resolve cases).
In contrast, the Canadian Supreme Court has concluded that the setting of compensation
must occur through methods less dependent on the will of a sitting parliament. See Reference on
Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court, 1997 Carswell Nat. 3038 (1997); see also G.
Gregg Webb & Keith E. Whittington, Judicial Independence, the Power of the Purse, and
Inherent Judicial Powers, 88 JUDICATURE 12 (2004) (describing an expanding doctrine of
judicial inherent power to require financing for its processes and describing a 2002 Kansas
Supreme Court order requiring an increase in fees to provide funds).
103 See Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary, and
Related Agencies, House Comm. on Appropriations, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Hon. John
G. Heyburn, II, Chair, Committee on the Budget of the Judicial Conference of the United States)
(raising concern about the "crisis" facing the federal courts and about the levels of appropriations
planned).
104 See also Judith Resnik, Judicial Independence and Article Ill-Too Little and Too Much,
72 S. CAL. L. REV. 657 (1999).
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that they serve for a fixed period of time. 10 5 Both Australia and Israel
require retirement at age seventy. 10 6 In Canada, the age of mandatory
retirement is seventy-five. 10 7 The constitutional courts of Germany and
France rely on another system: fixed terms. In Germany, judges serve
for a twelve-year, non-renewable term. 10 8  On France's special
constitutional body, members serve for a nine-year, non-renewable
term. 10 9 The new International Criminal Court has adopted that model,
providing for a nine-year, non-renewable term. 10 Further, within the
United States, Massachusetts, Vermont, and New Hampshire authorize
lifetime judgeships yet also require retirement at age seventy. l l'
In contrast, Article III judges do not have a defined term of office,
and they do not have an age for mandatory retirement. Therefore,
Article III judges make their own decisions about when to vacate a seat
to permit a new appointment-which enables judges to engage in
105 See Epstein, Knight & Shvetsova, Comparing Judicial Selection Systems, supra note 3, at
18, 23.
106 Until 1977, when the Constitution was amended by a referendum, judges were appointed
by life; judges appointed after the date of that amendment serve until seventy. See AUSTL.
CONST. ch. 11I, § 72 ("The appointment of a Justice of a the High Court shall be for a term
expiring upon his attaining the age of seventy years, and a person shall not be appointed as a
Justice of the High Court if he has obtained that age") (also providing that judges of "other courts
created by the Parliament," that is the federal courts, must also retire at that age). Israel's basic
law has a similar requirement. See ISRAEL, BASIC LAW: THE JUDICATURE, COURTS LAW
[Consolidated Version], 5744-1984, §§ 1-24, at http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/is03000_html
(providing for the term to end at the age of seventy, upon removal through specified means
including that a person's health makes continuation of service impossible).
107 Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., ch. S-26, § 9(2) (1985) (Can.) ("A judge shall cease to hold
office on attaining the age of seventy-five years.").
108 Article 4, Law of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany (as amended 1998),
available at http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/BVerfGG.htm.
109 See FRANCE CONST. tit. VII, art. 56 (adopted 1958) ("The Constitutional Conseil shall
consist of nine members, whose term of office shall last nine years and shall not be renewable.").
110 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9, Art. 36,
para. 9(a) (1998), available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm (describing the
initial election of judges with staggered terms and prohibiting the service in office of more than
nine years, with no judge eligible to reelection).
11l Massachusetts's 1780 constitution was amended in 1972 to include a retirement provision.
See MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 3, art. 1 (1780), as amended by art. XCVIII, 1973 (2003). This
provision has been upheld by jurists in state and federal court). In New Hampshire, its
constitution, N.H. CONST. art. 73, 78, has, since 1792, required judges to retire at the age of
seventy. In New Jersey, judges and justices serve for a seven-year term and once reappointed,
obtain life tenure with mandatory retirement at seventy. See N.J. CONST. art. VI, § III. In
Vermont, after selection by appointment, the mandatory retirement age is "not less than seventy
years of age, as the General Assembly may prescribe by law, or if the General Assembly has not
so provided by law, at the end of the calendar year" in which the judge becomes seventy. Retired
judges may serve by appointment for special assignments. See VT. CONST. § 35. Rhode Island is
a state in which the term of service continues to be unbounded by age. See R.I. CONST. art. X, § 5
(providing that justices of the Supreme Court may hold office "during good behavior"); see also
R.I. GEN. LAWS. § 8-16, 1-7 (2004) (providing that judges may continue to hold office "during
good behavior"). Retirement is provided for all judges who are incapacitated. See R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 8-16-9 (2004). See also Jon C. Blue, Judicial Tenure in Connecticut: How It Was
Gained and How It Was Lost-1818-1863, 20 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 125 (2000).
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opportunistic political behavior to time their retirements to maximize
the power of a particular party. Discussions about Supreme Court
justices assume that decisions about leaving are driven by these
considerations, and studies of turnover on the lower courts also suggest
such opportunistic behavior, although the most recent work concludes
that the availability of receiving funds from pensions is the key
variable. 112
How long do people actually sit as life-tenured jurists? For the
first twenty years of the life of the United States, between 1789 and
1809, the sixteen justices who served on the Supreme Court sat for an
average of fourteen years apiece. Turning to the lower courts, where
forty-seven judges served during that twenty year period, their time in
office averaged sixteen years but the lengths of service were uneven
across that group. Just under half (twenty-two) served fewer than ten
years and seven served more than forty years.
Moving centuries forward to the period from 1983 to 2003 and
having to deal with a larger group of people coming and going, the
average term for the six Supreme Court justices whose service finished
during that time period nearly doubled-to about twenty-four years.
The current Chief Justice has had a seat on the Court for more than
thirty years. For the lower courts (again on average and again with
some judgments about how to calculate the relevant intervals), 1 3 Article
III judges served twenty to twenty-five years before opening a seat for
another life-tenured appointment.114
112 See Deborah Barrow & Gary Zuk, An Institutional Analysis of Turnover in Lower Federal
Courts, 1900-1987, 52 J. POL. 457-76 (1990). But see Albert Yoon, The End of the Rainbow:
Understanding Turnover Among Federal Judges, 7 AM. J.L. & ECON. REV. (forthcoming 2005)
(on file with author) (arguing that the study did not sufficiently control for the role played by the
availability of pensions and, with different and more data, concluding that pensions play a pivotal
role in determining when lower court judges shift from "active" to "senior" status) [hereinafter
Yoon, Understanding Turnover].
113 See Appendix, Judith Resnik & Steven Wu, Methodological Note on Assessing the
Lengths of Judicial Service, 1800s/2000s, infra. The average length of service in the first period
is skewed upward by a few lower court judges who served for unusually long periods of time-
including Henry Potter, who spent fifty-seven years on the federal bench, and William Cranch,
who served for fifty-five years. As is detailed in the Appendix, for the earlier time period, we
began with judges who started their service in 1789, and then in a second set of nineteenth
century judges, we considered a group of judges by identifying individuals whose service
terminated between 1833 and 1853. For the third interval in the twentieth century, we worked
back from 2003 looking only at the length of service of those judges who had stopped serving (as
we defined it) during the twenty prior years.
114 Government databases provide information on each judge and their length of service. See
Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/
members.pdf; Federal Judges Biographical Database, at http://www.fjc.gov/newweb/
jnetweb.nsf/hisj. These estimates are drawn from those sources and informed by those made by
Albert Yoon, Love's Labor Lost? Judicial Tenure Among Lower Federal Court Judges: 1945-
2000, 91 CAL. L. REv. 1029 (2003). As detailed in the Appendix, choices exist about how to
analyze the information. Another compilation of data can be found in an unpublished manuscript
proposing term limits for the Supreme Court justices. See Steven G. Calabresi, Life Tenure
[Vol. 26:2
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Of course, measuring these two time periods provides snapshots of
judiciaries of very different sizes. While forty-seven people were in our
database of lower court judges serving between 1789 and 1809, 530
were in the set we considered in the late twentieth century. Further, to
capture a sense of the difference between those whose commissions
dated from 1789 and those who served in the last twentieth century, we
looked at the first twenty years, beginning in 1789 and then chose a
group whose commissions ended by 2003. To check to see if the two
different techniques of assembling a group of judges altered
significantly the conclusion that judges are now serving for longer
periods of time, we then assembled a third set of judges from the earlier
period by using a termination date (of between 1833 and 1853), which
is the same technique for selection as in the 1983-2003 set. Of that
group of nine justices whose service ended between 1833 and 1853, the
average length of service on the Supreme Court was twenty years. Of
the group of thirty-six lower court judges falling within that time frame,
the length of service averaged fourteen years.
In other words, given the very small numbers of people serving on
the Supreme Court, the length of service on that Court is erratic. In the
current era, justices serve for relatively long periods. On the lower
courts, one can conclude that the smaller number of jurists who held life
tenure in the nineteenth century did so for shorter periods of time than
do the larger number of individuals now holding that position. Chart 4,
Lengths of Service of Article III Judges: Contrasting Snapshots,
1800s/2000s, provides a summary, while details of the methodology can
be found in the Appendix.
Reconsidered: Term Limits for the Supreme Court (2004) (on file with the author).
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Chart 4 Lengths of Service of Article III Judges: Contrasting
Snapshots, 1800s/2000s
Federal Judges Whose Service Began Between 1789-1809
Court # of Judges or Avg. Length Avg. Age at Avg. Age at
Justices of Service Start Death
Supreme 16 14 years 47 years 67 years
Lower 47 16 years 43 years 64 years
Federal Judges Whose Service Terminated Between 1833-1853
Court # of Judges or Avg. Length Avg. Age at Avg. Age at
Justices of Service Start Death
Supreme 9 20 years 49 years 70 years
Lower 36 14 years 47 years 65 years
Federal Judges Whose Service Terminated Between 1983-2003
Court # of Judges or Avg. Length Avg. Age at Avg. Age at
Justices of Service Start Death
Supreme 6 24 years 57 years 88 years
Lower 530 24 years 52 years 75 years
Comparison of Lengths of Service: Lower Court Judges, 1800s/2000s
Year Range # of Judges or Avg. Length Avg. Age at Avg. Age at
Justices of Service Start Death
1789-1809 47 16 years 43 years 64 years
1833-1853 36 14 years 47 years 65 years
1983-2003 530 24 years 52 years 75 years
Source: Fed. Judical History Office of the Fed. Judicial Ctr., Federal Judges Biographical Database,
available at http://www.fjc.gov. This chart was prepared by Judith Resnik and Steven Wu.
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Many factors account for the growing length of service. More
people are appointed as judges and life spans have lengthened." 15
Further, a trend has emerged in which judges serving at a lower court
are promoted to a higher court-making for a career ladder in judging
that helps to produce more years in office. 1 6  Moreover, judges
understand the heavy workload of their colleagues, and while many take
"senior status," they continue to shoulder a large proportion of the
work. 1 7 And being a federal judge may correlate with longevity and
even be good for one's health. "18
In sum, in the United States, life tenure translates into a very long
term of service. Having long ago refused to have a Queen, this
democracy does not offer many government officials guaranteed jobs
for life. Members of Congress and the Executive can stay in power
only as long as they can convince voters to reelect them. Further, term
limits exist in both the federal system (for presidents) and in some states
(for elected officials) to ensure turnover for certain kinds of jobs. Yet in
the United States, as we currently read our constitutional provisions,
Article III judges can hold their positions indefinitely. As I explain
below, an alternative reading of the constitutional provision is possible
that would permit "life tenure" to include a fixed retirement age or a
term of service sufficiently long that it could be understood to meet the
constitutional criterion of service during "good Behaviour." (Too short
a term would run afoul of that requirement, as is illustrated by rulings
outside the United States concluding that temporary judges, dependent
for reappointment on prosecuting authorities, do not enjoy the kind of
independence requisite to impartial justice.)" 19
115 See Yoon, Understanding Turnover, supra note 112, at 13-14 (the percentage of younger
judges, categorized by looking at those appointed when under fifty-five, has grown in the last half
of the twentieth century, as has the life-expectancy of men, from sixty-five to seventy-five years).
116 See Appendix, Methodological Note on Assessing the Lengths of Service, 1800s/2000s,
infra (using for estimates of the length of judges' careers their service on the lower courts of
whatever kind but counting separately the years of service on the Supreme Court).
117 Albert Yoon, Senior Federal Judges, supra note 57 (estimating that senior judges comprise
forty percent of all sitting Article III judges and that they preside in about thirty percent of the
cases). For analysis of departures from the bench for reasons other than age or health, see Emily
Field Van Tassel, Resignations and Removals: A History of Federal Judicial Service-and
Disservice, 1789-1992, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 333, 345-49 (1993).
118 Some commentators, in contrast, worry that some jurists stay on beyond their ability to do
the job. See David J. Garrow, Mental Decrepitude on the US. Supreme Court: The Historical
Case for a 28th Amendment, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 995 (2000); see also Epstein, Knight, &
Shvetsova, supra note 3, at 26-27 (analyzing the retirement dates of sitting American justices on
the Supreme Court and the role several justices of advanced age played on the Court).
119 See, e.g., Starrs v. Ruxton, 2000 S.L.T. 42, 2000 SC(JC) 208 (High Court of Justiciary,
Scotland) (relying on Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms to conclude that too short a term of office and a term dependent upon the prosecution
for reappointment is a violation). Some Canadian cases address a comparable concern. See
Reference re: Territorial Court Act (N.W.T.) S.6(2) (1997), 152 D.L.R. (4th) 132 (N.W.T. Sup.
Ct.). This approach raises questions, founded on due process and Article III that are different
619
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B. Forms of Power
Turn now to the forms of power that Article III judges hold. I have
already adverted to the fact that over the twentieth century, life-tenured
judges in the lower courts gained the authority to pick large numbers of
other federal judges. At the Supreme Court level, our justices have
other new powers, also coming to them only during the twentieth
century. One is the authority to make national procedural rules.
Beginning in the 1930s, Congress authorized the Supreme Court to
promulgate federal rules of civil procedure, and then of criminal
procedure, of evidence, of bankruptcy, of admiralty, and of appellate
procedure.1 20 Congress also gave the Chief Justice control over the
administrative apparatus of the federal courts through his authority over
the Judicial Conference of the United States, the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts, and the Federal Judicial Center. 121
Further, during the twentieth century, the Supreme Court gained
the power to pick virtually all of its cases, for its docket has become
almost completely discretionary. 122 With the small exception of certain
redistricting cases 123 and of a few original jurisdiction cases involving
certain controversies between two states,1 24 the Court has unfettered
discretion to decide what it will hear.125 Moreover, unlike the practices
in some countries, no requests for review are heard orally, and no
explanations for refusing to grant certiorari are required.
The impact of the power of choice can be seen by considering the
declining number of cases decided by the Supreme Court in recent
years. About one hundred years ago, the Court heard an average of 330
cases per term and had a backlog. When discussion was had in the
1920s about moving to a discretionary docket, the Solicitor General
then estimated that the Court could likely decide between 400 and 500
from those generally made about the constitutionality of "recess appointments" made by
President Bush. See note 177-178 infra.
120 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-77 (2000) (describing generally the processes of rulemaking); 28
U.S.C. § 2072 (2002) (authorizing appellate, evidence, civil, criminal, and admiralty procedural
rules); 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (2002) (authorizing bankruptcy rulemaking).
121 See Resnik, Constricting Remedies, supra note 73, at 272-95
122 See Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years
After the Judges'Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643 (2000).
123 See 28 USC § 1257 (2000) (providing jurisdiction, by appeal, from rulings determined by a
three-judge court created through an act of Congress); 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (2000) (requiring a three-
judge court for actions challenging "the constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional
districts or the apportionment of any statewide legislative body"). In the last five years, for
example, the Court considered fewer than forty cases through this route, with opinions issued in
eleven and summary decisions in twenty-seven.
124 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000). In the last five years, for example, the Court has considered
fewer than fifteen cases filed under its original jurisdiction docket. See, e.g., New Jersey v. New
York, 526 U.S. 589 (1999) (addressing the ownership of landfill portions of Ellis Island).
125 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1257 (2000).
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cases of import annually. 126 Once armed with increased discretion to
choose its cases, the Court's caseload declined. Academic commentary
discussed the change and assumed that about 150 cases a year was what
the Court could reasonably do well, 127 which fit what the Court did for a
period of time. For example, during the early 1980s, the Court received
about 2,200 fee-paid petitions for certiorari and about 6,000 in forma
pauperis filings, and it issued about 160 written decisions per year.
More recently, the Court has received about 1,900 fee-paid certiorari
petitions and about 6,000 in forma pauperis petitions, 128 but renders on
average some eighty to eighty-five written opinions a year.1
29
The Supreme Court's ability to set all of its own agenda affects not
only the perception of a court as a political branch of government but
also the experience of the justices who sit on it. That level of freedom
changes the job from one more confined and responsive to the
obligations of rendering judgment to a form of decisionmaking that,
with its great discretion, inevitably takes on a character termed
"political," in the sense of having opportunities to develop--or to
decline to develop--certain areas of law.
Another consequence of the United States system is that power has
devolved to lower tier Article III judges. The intermediate appellate
courts are the functional end-point for almost all cases. 130 In 2003,
about 60,000 appeals were filed and a roughly comparable number
terminated in the federal circuit courts-many without written
decision.131 In turn, life-tenured trial judges are the functional end-point
126 Hartnett, supra note 122, at 1646 n.14 (citing testimony from the 1922 Hearings on
proposed legislation for more discretion in caseload selection).
127 Id. at 1646.
128 See Statistical Recap of the Supreme Court 's Workload During the Last Three Terms, 52
U.S.L.W. 3025 (July 26, 1983); Statistical Recap of the Supreme Court's Workload During the
Last Three Terms, 73 U.S.L.W. 3044 (July 13, 2004). The averages come from filings during the
1980-1981 through 1982-1983 terms and those from the 2001-2002 through 2003-2004 terms.
Because lawyers prepare most of the paid filings, the assumption is that they screen out cases and
that more of those filings as compared with the filings in forma pauperis are likely to meet the
eligibility criteria for selection.
129 See Statistical Recap of the Supreme Court's Workload During the Last Three Terms, 52
U.S.L.W. 3025 (July 26, 1983); Statistical Recap of the Supreme Court's Workload During the
Last Three Terms, 72 U.S.L.W. 3044 (July 13, 2004); see also LEE EPSTEIN, JEFFREY A. SEGAL,
HAROLD J. SPAETH & THOMAS G. WALKER, THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA,
DECISIONS & DEVELOPMENTS tbl. 2-2, tbl. 2-8 (2003).
130 Further, one of the criterion for Supreme Court selection of cases is disagreements among
the circuits-giving judges on the circuit courts important roles as dispatchers to the Supreme
Court. See SuP. CT. R. 10(c). On occasion, opinions filed by those judges expressly or implicitly
call for Supreme Court review.
131 Publication rates also vary by circuits. See JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS, 2003, supra note 96, at tbl. S-3 (Appeals Commenced, Terminated and Pending, and
Types of Opinions or Orders Filed During the Period Ending Sept. 30, 2003). Controversy has
arisen around circuits that prohibited the citation of decisions that judges had designated as not
for citation, and proposed new rules would permit all decisions written to be cited by litigants.
Implementation of those rules was postponed because the Standing Committee on Rules of
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for most litigants. Of the roughly 325,000 filings every year (both
criminal and civil) at the trial level,132 fewer than one in four is seen by
an appellate court. 133
Meanwhile those trial level judges, sitting singly, also gained more
power over the last century. Under the current procedures in use in
almost all the federal district courts, a case is assigned from filing to
disposition to a specific judge. Procedural reforms have shifted the
focus to pre-trial activities, which gives more discretion to trialjudges. 134 Trials are now anomalous, as fewer than two percent of
pending civil cases begin a trial. 135
V. JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS AS A FORM OF AND FORUM FOR POLITICS
As becomes clear from this review of the demand on, the
constitutional structure for, and the power of Article III judges, being an
Article III judge in the United States is a big deal, a long deal, and a rare
deal. This overview also explains why battles over judgeships are not
surprising. Life-tenured judgeships of the U.S. kind provide
opportunities for a president desirous of making a longstanding mark on
the law 136 or of changing the demography of those who serve as life-
time judges. 137 Moreover, as the process for selection has evolved, with
its inclusion of a public inquiry by the Senate, judicial appointments are
Practice and Procedure called for more study. See Appellate Rule Revision Postponed, 72
U.S.L.W. 2766, 2767 (June 22, 2004).
132 In 2003, about 250,000 civil cases and 70,000 criminal proceedings were brought. See
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 2003, supra note 96, at tbls. C, D (Civil
and Criminal Cases Commenced, Terminated and Pending During the 12-Month Period Ending
September 30, 2003).
133 id. at tbl. S-3 (U.S. Court of Appeals, Commenced, Terminated, and Pending cases during
the twelve-month period ending September 30, 2003) (filings of about 60,000 cases).
134 Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Process, 1994 WIS. L.
REV. 631; Resnik, Trial As Error, supra note 27.
135 See Galanter, supra note 98, at 459. His article is part of a symposium focused on that fact
and produced under the auspices of the Litigation Section of the American Bar Association. See
also Resnik, Migrating, Morphing, and Vanishing, supra note 18. The data are also provided
annually. See, e.g., JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 2003, supra note 96, at
tbl. T-I (U.S. District Courts, Civil and Criminal Trials by District During the Twelve Month
Period Ending September 30, 2003).
Some judges have become concemed about the rarity of trials. For example, the Honorable
Patrick Higginbotham of the Fifth Circuit calculated that, on average, a federal district judge has
14 trials per year. See Patrick E. Higginbotham, So Why Do We Call Them Trial Courts?, 55
SMU L. REV. 1405, 1405 (2002).
136 See Dawn E. Johnsen, Ronald Reagan and the Rehnquist Court on Congressional Power:
Presidential Influences on Constitutional Change, 78 IND. L.J. 363 (2003); Sheldon Goldman,
Elliot Slotnick, Gerard Gryski, Gary Zuk, & Sara Schiavoni, W. Bush Remaking the Judiciary:
Like Father Like Son?, 86 JUDICATURE 282 (2003).
137 See Mary L. Clark, Carter's Groundbreaking Appointment of Women to the Federal
Bench: His Other "Human Rights" Record, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 1131 (2003).
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frequently used as a means to speak to various constituencies.
I turn therefore to explore the culture around federal judicial
appointments. And again, context is needed. Over the past 200 years,
some 140 individuals have been nominated to the Supreme Court.
38
Information about nominations became generally available in 1916,
when the Senate Judiciary Committee held public hearings and
published a report on the nomination of Louis D. Brandeis, the first
Jewish justice on the Supreme Court. 139 While public hearings occurred
for that nomination, Brandeis himself did not testify. In 1925, Harlan F.
Stone was the first to speak on his own behalf before the Senate's
Committee on the Judiciary. 140 According to the Committee notes, the
invitation was extended at 10:00 a.m., and Mr. Stone, then Attorney
General, appeared at 11:30; "he was interrogated by a number of the
members of the Committee. The proceedings are in the form of
transcript, taken by a stenographer."' 141 After a six-hour debate open to
the public, seventy-one Senators voted to confirm. 142 In the decade
thereafter, "[a]ll of the New Deal appointees from Senator Black to
Attorney General Murphy [were] present at the Committee hearings and
available to testify" but only Felix Frankfurter was questioned.
143
The public process in the United States is often assumed to be the
138 See THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 965-71
(Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992). Many books have been written detailing appointment processes and
the histories of particular appointees. See, e.g., GERHARDT, supra note 13; HERMAN SCHWARTZ,
RIGHT WING JUSTICE: THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TO TAKE OVER THE COURTS (2004);
DAVID A. YALOF, PURSUIT OF JUSTICES: PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS AND THE SELECTION OF
SUPREME COURT NOMINEES (1999).
139 See ROY M. MERSKY & J. MYRON JACOBSTEIN, Preface to Volume 1, THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: HEARINGS AND REPORTS ON SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL
NOMINATIONS OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES BY THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE 1916-
1972 (Hein 1977 & supp.) (nineteen volumes compiled by Mersky and Jacobstein). For an
understanding of the confirmation process during the nineteenth century, the records of which can
be found in the National Archives, see John P. Frank, The Appointment of Supreme Court
Justices: Prestige, Principles, and Politics, 1941 WIS. L. REV. 172 (Part I), 343 (Part 1I), and 461
(Part 1II) (addressing late nineteenth as well as twentieth century appointments and detailing the
controversies over many).
140 Frank, supra note 139, at 492 ("On January 28th, the Committee examined Stone for four
hours.").
141 Special Meeting of the Full Committee on Stone Nomination, Jan. 28, 1925, Committee on
the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, Minutes, 1923-25, 68th Cong., Records of the U.S. Senate, Record
Group 46, National Archives (Washington, D.C.). The testimony is not reproduced in the Mersky
and Jacobstein compilation, supra note 140, but it is detailed by John Frank. See Frank, supra
note 139, at 493-94. As Frank explained, President Coolidge had been reelected but, because of
the strong vote for the La Follette-Wheeler Progressive ticket, "Senate committee assignments
were withheld from Republican Progressives, and President Coolidge undertook to discriminate
against them in patronage distribution." Id. at 489. Therefore a group of Senators opposed to
Coolidge "opposed anything he did," including making charges against his nominee, Harlan Fiske
Stone for harassing Senator Wheeler with a prosecution aimed at smearing Progressives, for
unethical behavior while in practice, and for being affiliated with special interests. Id. at 490-97.
142 Frank, supra note 139, at 497.
143 Id. at491 n.lll.
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source of contestation. But as political scientists Charles Cameron and
Jeffrey Segal detail, battles over appointments predate the practice of
the Senate's Judiciary Committee holding open hearings on individual
nominees. According to an 1888 New York Times article, discussing the
nomination of Melville Fuller to be Chief Justice, "[t]he Judiciary
Committee... began a rousing search into all the dark abodes of
scandal and tattle, to hunt for something against the character of the
President's nominee."' 144 As Cameron and Segal characterize the eighty
nominations made to the Supreme Court between 1877 and 1994,145
seventy succeeded, but twenty-four were controversial. 146
Further, Professors Cameron and Segal argue that, although the
political grounds for opposition in the Senate have varied (as I will also
detail below), the tactics used have remained "remarkably consistent."
Opponents relied heavily on delay to find what Cameron and Segal term
"scandal," which they use to denote claims (even if erroneous) of
"ethical or financial lapses, illegalities, misconduct, or allegations of
unprofessional or unethical conduct as an attorney or judge."'1 47 As their
review indicates, a key variable of a nominee's success is the position
taken by those presidents who have the power to set the agenda and use
the nomination process to send messages to constituencies.
The constitutionally-created selection process permits purposeful
presidents to use it for a variety of different goals. As an important
recent article by Professor Dawn Johnsen documents, the Department of
Justice under Ronald Reagan decided to focus on lower court and
Supreme Court nominations as a means of changing legal doctrines. 148
The Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice developed
white papers, guidelines, and directives that identified areas of law to be
reshaped through litigation, legislation, and judicial selection. 149 For
example, one report, The Constitution in the Year 2000,15 argued that:
144 Charles M. Cameron & Jeffrey A. Segal, The Politics of Scandals: The Case of Supreme
Court Nominations. 1877-1994. at 1, available at http://www.yale.edu/isps/seminars/american_
pol/cameron.pdf (manuscript on file with the author).
145 Id. at 2. They picked those dates to permit time for the reemergence of partisan politics
after the Civil War.
146 Their methodology was to read all discussion of nominees in articles published in the New
York Times during the time period they studied. Id. at 10. They classified twenty-four as
controversial but twenty-three as scandalous by distinguishing one case as controversial but not
involving what they categorize as "scandal." Id. at 2.
147 Id. at 10. They excluded four instances-the first nomination of Stanley Mathews, which
expired as a Congress went out of session, the withdrawn nomination of Abe Fortas, the mooted
one of Homer Thornberry, and the quickly repudiated one of Douglas Ginsburg. Id. at 11.
148 Johnsen, supra note 136, at 367; see also SCHWARTZ, supra note 138 (mapping the use by
the Reagan Administration and the Bush presidencies of nominations to change the meaning of
federal law).
149 Johnsen, supra note 136, at 384-97.
150 OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE YEAR 2000: CHOICES AHEAD IN
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few factors .. are more critical to determining the course of the
Nation, and yet more often overlooked, than the values and
philosophies of the men and women who populate the third co-equal
branch of the national government-the federal judiciary.' 5 1
The Administration's goals included a rereading of the United
States Constitution to diminish federal authority and leave more control
in state government. Efforts focused on reducing congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause, limiting rights to abortion, and
circumscribing the possibility of affirmative action. As Professor
Johnsen explains, President Reagan's greatest influence on the
development of constitutional meaning came not through litigation
successes at the time but through judicial appointments, especially to
the United States Supreme Court.152 Further, as Professor Yalof details,
President Reagan's approach was very disciplined:
At no time was President Reagan tempted to choose nominees whom
he knew personally .... This was a criteria-driven selection
framework [and] the most important criteria were ideological....
[T]he Reagan administration wanted to sponsor ardently
conservative candidates for the high court.
1 53
The strategy forged under President Reagan has been pursued by
subsequent Republican administrations. For example, in 1990, the
counsel to President George H.W. Bush commented that the aim of that
administration's judicial selection was "to shift the courts in a more
conservative direction. ' 154 Of course, success depends on other factors,
including the timing and order in which nominees are put forth,
155
whether the Senate is dominated at the time by the same party as that of
the President 156 and, if so, whether those Senators are in conflict or in
accord with that President. Yet, on most accounts, the Nixon, Reagan,
and Bush agendas have been successful in putting on the federal bench
individuals who have changed constitutional doctrine and have limited
the equitable powers of federal judges. 157 And the efforts continue. As
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1988) [hereinafter CONSTITUTION IN YEAR 2000]; see also
OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, GUIDELINES ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION (1988).
151 Johnsen, supra note 136, at 397 (quoting CONSTITUTION IN YEAR 2000, supra note 150, at
v).
152 Id.
153 YALOF, supra note 138, at 134.
154 Id. at 401 n.212.
155 See, e.g., Cameron & Segal, supra note 144, at 5 (quoting a memo to President Nixon that
counseled him to put a more conservative nominee up for the first of two openings so as to avoid
giving senators the opportunity to make a "public case against a man") (citation omitted).
156 Senate norms also play a role, including courtesy (sometimes extended) towards senators
from the state of the nominee. See Sarah A. Binder, Origins of the Senate "Blue Slip": The
Politics of Creating Senate Norms (April 2004) (manuscript on file with the author) (presented at
the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association) [hereinafter Binder, Blue Slip].
157 See Resnik, Constricting Remedies, supra note 73, at 231-71.
HeinOnline -- 26 Cardozo L. Rev.  625 2004-2005
CARDOZO LA W REVIEW
the White House Counsel to the current President Bush explained, the
President has nominated a "record number of federal judges ... almost
double the nominations that any of the past six presidents submitted in
the first year"; that record "perhaps represents the President's longest
lasting legacy.' 58
Today's judicial appointment process is also deeply affected by
organized activity outside of government. One group-the American
Bar Association-has served since 1952 as a subcontractor to gather
information, initially at the behest of the presidency and more recently
at the request of some members of the Senate. Describing its role as
"nonpartisan," the ABA ranks individuals on the basis of what the ABA
terms "professional qualifications."' 159 The ABA does so through a
Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary, working separately from
other parts of the ABA and evaluating what it terms professional
qualities including integrity, "intellectual capacity, judgment, writing
and analytic ability, knowledge of the law and breadth of professional
experience" but not a candidate's "philosophy or ideology.' 60 To do
so, committee members review a nominee's answers to a Department of
Justice questionnaire as well as conduct confidential interviews with
candidates (if willing) and with others and then rate a candidate as "well
qualified," "qualified," or "not qualified." In addition, members
testified about the ABA views at hearings on nominations. 161
From 1952 until 2001, sitting presidents had a practice of
consulting the ABA and obtaining its judgment before sending
individual nominations to the Senate. Until 1997, members of the ABA
served as advisors at the Judiciary Committee's hearings. In that year,
the chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Orrin Hatch, terminated
that relationship. According to one analyst, that decision resulted from
the ABA committee's rating of Robert Bork. While a majority of the
ABA committee found him "well qualified" for the Supreme Court, a
minority found Judge Bork "not qualified."' 162 In 2001, the White
House announced that it would no longer submit names of prospective
nominees to the ABA. As of this writing, members of the Senate
158 See Alberto Gonzales, Editorial, The Crisis in Our Courts, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25 2002, at
A 18; see also Frances A. McMorris, Bush Successful in Appointing Activist Judges, WOMEN'S E-
NEWS, June 25, 2004, available at http://www.womensnews.org/article.cfm/dyn/aid/
1883/context/archive; The White House, Judicial Nominations, available at http://www.white
house.gov/infocus/j udicialnominees.
159 See The ABA Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary: What It Is and How It Works,
available at http://www.abanet.org/scfedjud/backgrounder.html.
160 Id. The committee is comprised of a small number of persons from each of the federal
circuits who, upon joining, agree not to be involved in federal electoral campaigns through public
fundraising.
161 Id.
162 GERHARDT, supra note 13, at 230 (describing that finding as based on the view that Judge
Bork lacked a temperament appropriate for the role).
626 [Vol. 26:2
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Judiciary Committee request the ABA's evaluation, and that evaluation
occurs after (rather than before) a candidate's nomination.' 63
But the ABA is not the only organization. relevant to judicial
nominations. The Reagan/Bush focused search for nominees who
believed in certain interpretations of the United States Constitution
turned frequently to those affiliated with a group, the Federalist Society,
formed in 1982 to help to propagate commitments to its vision of what
American legal order entailed.164 Moreover, the Federalist Society has
itself attempted to curb the involvement of the ABA by attempting to
position that organization as too liberal and "political" a voice to
represent "the profession." One technique used by the Federalist
Society is a special newsletter, called The ABA Watch, to describe ABA
positions in an effort to mark it as partisan. 65 On the other side of the
fence, the Alliance for Justice and the Brennan Center have both created
newsletters and websites to disseminate information to those concerned
about judicial nominations and to enlist support for opposing or
supporting individual nominees. 1
66
In terms of activities in the states, two other organizations-the
Chamber of Commerce and the American Trial Lawyers Association-
have poured money into judicial elections in several instances.1 67 These
battles, in turn, spark new legal issues, including the degree to which
163 ABA Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary, supra note 160, at n.. The Senate
Judiciary Committee also asks that nominees fill out questionnaires providing information on
employment, education, published writings, congressional testimony, health, public office and
political activities and affiliations, legal career, involvement in other activities, sources of income
and net worth, as well as whether a selection commission exists in the jurisdiction from which the
candidate comes. See Questionnaire for Nominees Before the Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate (marked Confidential) (unpublished questionnaire on file with the author).
164 See David McIntosh, Introduction to the Federalist Society 2002 Symposium on Law and
Truth, 26 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL'Y ix (2002). Further, the Federalist Society describes its mission
as "reforming the current legal order." See The Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy,
Our Background (2001), available at http://www.fed-soc.org/ourbackground.htm.
165 The publication comes out periodically. See, e.g., The Federal Society for Law and Public
Policy Studies, The ABA Watch (Aug. 2004) available at http://www.fed-soc.org/Publication/
ABAwatch/jul04.pdf.
166 See, e.g., Home Page of the Independent Judiciary, available at http://www.independent
judiciary.org/nominees; The Justice at Stake Campaign: A National Partnership Working for Fair
and Impartial Courts, available at http://www.faircourts.org.
167 Judicial elections in states have become more expensive because of the entry of such
national participants. Further, analyses of the "market" in advertisements demonstrate that
funders focus on particular races. See Anthony Champagne, Interest Groups and Judicial
Elections, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1391 (2001). As Champagne explained:
[T]he continuing nationalization of state judicial elections is further shown by the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce's recent efforts through the Institute for Legal Reform to
support the election of pro-business judges in Alabama, Illinois, Michigan, Mississippi,
and Ohio. The goal is both to make direct campaign contributions and to pay for issue
advertising.
Id. at 1399; see also William G. Kelly, Selection of Judges, ABA JUDICIAL DIVISION RECORD 3
(Winter, 2000) (describing efforts by the Chamber of Commerce and the Trial Lawyers and
"other interest groups ... raking the candidates over the coals.")
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judicial campaigning and the financing of elections can be regulated. Ajudicial candidate succeeded in persuading a bare majority of the United
States Supreme Court that a state ethics regulation violated his free
speech rights. 168
Several states continue to seek to constrain judgeship campaigns.
For example, in the fall of 2004, the Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted
new rules guiding campaign activities of judges. 169 The Court limited
solicitation of funds by candidates for judgeships and prohibited
candidates and sitting judges from making "pledges, promises, or
commitments" on issues likely to come before them. 70 Alaska, which
had the advantage of crafting a system relatively recently, has attempted
to minimize political influences through a constitutional provision
requiring that a Judicial Council solicit and screen applicants "without
regard to political affiliation."'71 Its code of conduct for judges places
limits on contributions to retention election campaigns.1 72
But in many states, contributions for campaigns have increased,
significant funds come from outside the state, and spending has proven
to be an effective means of obtaining a judgeship. 73 The result is
distress about judicial selection. That concern, coupled with insufficient
funding for state judiciaries, prompted a blue ribbon commission of the
American Bar Association to title its recent report Justice in
Jeopardy.174
168 See Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
169 Supreme Court of Wisconsin, No. 00-07, In the Matter of the Amendment of Supreme
Court Rules: SCR Chapter 60, Code of Judicial Conduct-Campaigns, Elections, Political
Activity (filed Oct. 29, 2004) 2004 WI 134. The rules were adopted by a divided court, with three
of the seven justices objecting that they were not sufficiently respectful of candidates' First
Amendment rights. See Jenny Price, Court Divided on Rules for Judicial Candidates, DULUTH
NEWS TRIB., Nov. 4, 2004, available at http://www.duluthsuperior.com/mld/duluthsuperior/
news/politics/10101416.htm.
170 The rules were developed after the Supreme Court of Wisconsin created a Judicial
Elections and Ethics Commission in the late 1990s. See supra note 169.171 See ALASKA CONST. art. 4, § 8. The Constitution specifies that the Commission include
three non-lawyers appointed by the governor and confirmed by the legislature sitting in a joint
session, three lawyers appointed by the governing board of the Alaska Bar Association, and the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Alaska, serving ex officio as the chair. Members serve for
staggered six-year terms. See American Judicature Society, Judicial Selection in the States,
Alaska, available at http://www.ajs.org/js/AK-methods.htm [hereinafter Judicial Selection].172 Individuals may donate only $1,000; Political Action Committees (PACs) are limited to
$2,000 per candidate and regulated industries, corporations, and labor unions may not donate.
See ALASKA STAT. § 15.13.010, 15.13.070-074 (2004); see also Judicial Selection, supra note
171; Alaska v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597 (Alaska 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S.
1153 (2000); Libertarian Party of Alaska, Inc. v. Alaska, 101 P.3d 616 (Alaska 2004) (both
upholding aspects of state laws regulating campaign funding and disclosure).
173 See Andrew Goldstein, Money Talks, LEGAL AFF., Jan./Feb. 2005, at 50, 52 (describing the
three "Democratic candidates for the Ohio Supreme Court," all of whom lost, as having been
"outspent by more than 9 to 1").
174 American Bar Association, Justice in Jeopardy: Report of the American Bar Association
Commission on the 21st Century Judiciary (July 2003), available at http://www.manning
productions.com/ABA263/finalreport.pdf.
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VI. THE UTILITY OF CONFLICT
That the United States Constitution specifies that both electoral
branches of government have a role to play in selecting life-tenured
judges does not require that battles occur or that the job be seen as
political. Rather, it is theoretically possible for the constitutional
process to work in a way seen as minimally political. For example, a
president could ask that the Department of Justice, the Senate, or a bi-
partisan commission propose a short list of individuals, all of whom
would be selected based on criteria other than political party affiliation,
campaign donations, membership in organizations such as the Federalist
Society or the American Civil Liberties Union, social policy views, and
the like. Alternatively, a president could develop a pattern of sharing
the selection process with the opposition in the Senate such that
partisans of both parties partake equally in identifying candidates.
Potentially, a culture could develop that focuses on individuals' legal
acumen, personal humanity, contributions to public service, and the
like.175
Such has not been the experience during virtually any of the
history of the United States. Further, as described above, the last
several Republican presidents have specifically targeted nominations as
the means by which to do a certain form of politics.' 76 The current
President ran on a platform that he would select judges identified with
particular political and social world views, and he has in fact done so.
Repeatedly, he has used judicial nominations of individuals, particularly
for appellate level positions, as a vehicle to speak to sectors of his
constituency. Further, relying on claimed powers to make "recess"
appointments 77 during intervals when the Senate is out of session,
175 A recent spate of law review articles seeks to identify other forms of "merit"-with criteria
such as productivity, citation rates, and reversal rates (for individuals already on lower courts)
that others challenge as neither necessarily objective or wise. See, e.g., Stephen Choi & Mitu
Galati, A Tournament of Judges?, 92 CAL. L. REV. 299 (2004); David C. Vladeck, Keeping
Score: The Utility of Empirical Measurements of Judicial Selection, 32 FLA. ST. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2005), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-616944.
176 See YALOF, supra note 138, at 190-207. Yalof contrasted President Clinton's "interest in a
quick and painless confirmation process [that] quickly turned into an obsession, infiltrating nearly
every stage of his decisionmaking process," id. at 190, with the approach of the first President
Bush, who focused on ideology and "confirmability" by looking for candidates about whom little
was known. Id. at 190-9 1.
177 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (authorizing the President "to fill up all Vacancies that
may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the
End of their next Session"). The constitutionality of using such appointments during brief
recesses is explored in several recent articles. See generally William T. Mayton, Recess
Appointments and an Independent Judiciary, 20 CONST. COMM. 515 (2004); Edward A. Hartnett,
Recess Appointments of Article Ill Judges, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 377 (2004). In addition to the
issues addressed in those articles (primarily focused on Article II), challenges to the legality of
temporary judgeships can be based on the view that judges dependent on renomination by the
Executive in a relatively short time frame lack the kind of independence guaranteed by both the
629
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President Bush placed on the federal bench two individuals who had
been the subject of hearings but who had prompted objections
sufficiently intense as to have occasioned filibusters of their
nominations. 17 8
Moreover, interest in filling vacancies and adding judgeships also
varies with party power. For example, only a few years ago when the
number of vacancies was higher and President Clinton was in office, the
Honorable J. Harvie Wilkinson III, an appointee of a Republican
Administration and serving on the Fourth Circuit, argued against filling
vacant seats. 179 In contrast, once the Republicans took control of the
White House, the Administration took the position that a "crisis"
existed, and posted such a message on the website of the Department of
Justice. 80 But despite the drumbeat about a "crisis," the pace of
dispositions was both reasonable' 8 and not much different than it had
been in the years when Republicans had claimed that vacancies need not
Due Process Clause and Article Il1.
178 Under current practices, sixty votes are needed to break a filibuster in the Senate.
Specifically, President Bush appointed William Pryor to the Eleventh Circuit and Charles
Pickering to the Fifth Circuit. In the winter of 2004, Judge Pickering announced his retirement.
See Adam Liptak, Judge Appointed by Bush After Impasse in Senate Retires, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
10, 2004, at A3.
In the spring of 2004, Senator Edward Kennedy challenged the legality of these
appointments. See Letter from Edward Kennedy to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit Regarding the Recess Appointment of William H. Pryor, Jr. (March 5, 2004),
available at http://www.kennedy.senate.gov/index high.html. Thereafter, Senator Kennedy filed
a Motion to Submit an Amicus Brief in support of efforts by a set of appellees in Stephens v.
Evans, No. 02-16424 (11th Cir. 2004), to disqualify Judge Pryor on the grounds that his
appointment was illegal. The Eleventh Circuit rejected that filing as time-barred. See Jonathan
Ringel, Kennedy's Last-Ditch Effort to Block Pryor Fails (June 11, 2004), available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1086706010561. The Eleventh Circuit rejected the
challenge on the merits in Evans v. United States, 387 F.3d 1220 (11 th Cir. 2004) (en banc). Two
judges dissented.
Senator Kennedy also submitted an amicus brief in support of a certiorari petition that
raised the question of the constitutionality of an intra-session recess appointment. See Miller v.
United States, No. 04-38 (docketed July 8, 2004) (pending as of Jan. 3, 2005).
179 See J. Harvie Wilkinson III, We Don't Need More Federal Judges, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9,
1998, at A19; J. Harvie Wilkinson Ill, The Drawbacks of Growth in the Federal Judiciary, 43
EMORY L.J. 1147 (1994). See generally Conserving Judicial Resources: Considering the
Appropriate Allocation of Judgeships in the US. Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Fifth, and
Eleventh Circuits: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Administrative Oversight and the Courts of
the Senate Comm. the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 13-18 (1997) (statement of Hon. Harvie Wilkinson
I1).
180 See Gonzales, supra note 158, at Al8. For a time, a similar message was posted on the
website of the Department of Justice. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Legal Policy, Judicial
Nominations, 108th Cong., at 4 ("White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales Discusses the Crisis in
Our Courts"), at http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/judicialnominations.htm.
181 The median time to disposition for district court criminal and civil cases that are not tried
ranges from six to nine months; for cases on appeal, dispositions occur, again at the median, in
about eleven months. See JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 2003, supra note
96, at tbls. B-4, C-5, D-6. For those cases that proceed through decision to appeal, the median
time from filing a complaint to disposition on appeal is about twenty-six months. Id. at tbl. B-4.
Further, as noted, the federal judicial system is one in which trials are rare.
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be filled. 182 And, as noted, repeat players from outside government are
now central figures in these conflicts in both the federal and state
systems.
I have just given a description of the current highly politicized
process. But I do not share the popular view that politicizing federal
judicial selection is intrinsically abhorrent. It is neither surprising nor
wrong that conflict over decisions to appoint particular individuals has
emerged. Life tenure is a rare event in any democracy, and those
selected and confirmed to serve must, therefore, be individuals in whom
confidence is shared. Further, as Charles Geyh has pointed out, given
how few judges are impeached, the only moment for popular input is at
the time of selection. 183 And, as Professor Charles Black explained
several decades ago, no reason--"textual," "structural," "prudential," or
"historical"--exists for objecting to reading the Constitution's words
"advise and consent" to authorize members of the Senate to take an
active role in shaping the federal judiciary.' 84
In short, no apologies are needed when either the President or the
Senate carefully scrutinizes individuals and spends time analyzing their
records. 85 Moreover, as I detail below, the nominations process has
become a useful venue for identifying conflicts about what tenets are
central to American law.
A. A Venue for Debating Norms
When attitudes are widely shared, they are not perceived to be
"ideology." Only when norms and values are contested do we think of
a set of questions as touching on ideology. The question of the role and
rights of women provides one example. By reviewing the transcripts of
nominations to the United States Supreme Court over the last several
182 Moreover, to the extent that the focus has been on the growing docket of the appellate
courts, those courts have come to rely on active or senior district judges or on senior circuit
judges who sit "by designation." As of a few years ago, in about a quarter of the published
appellate opinions, the panel of judges on the case included a judge sitting by designation. The
practice of using such judges varies by circuit, with some relying more heavily on them than
others.
183 Geyh, supra note 17, at 220.
184 See Black, supra note 39, at 664. See generally PAUL SIMON, ADVICE & CONSENT:
CLARENCE THOMAS, ROBERT BORK, AND THE INTRIGUING HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT
NOMINATION BATTLES (1992); Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 39; Robert F. Nagel, Advice,
Consent, and Influence, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 858 (1990); Resnik, Changing Criteria for Judging
Judges, supra note 9; Paul A. Freund, Appointment of Justices: Some Historical Perspectives,
101 HARV. L. REV. 1146 (1988).
185 I have so stated as a participant in Senate hearings. See The Senate's Role in the
Nomination and Confirmation Process: Whose Burden?: Hearings before the Subcomm. on
Admin. Oversight and the Courts, Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 179, 181 (2001)
(statement of Judith Resnik), reprinted in 50 DRAKE L. REV. 511 (2002).
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decades, one can see how attitudes about women's rights changed. 86
Up until 1970, women were invisible in the hearings. In the 1980s,
however, conflict about constitutional guarantees of the equal protection
of women became a central aspect of debate about the propriety of the
confirmation of nominees.
Specifically, the first question about attitudes of a nominee towards
women emerged in 1970, when George Harrold Carswell was
questioned. 87 Congresswoman Patsy Mink from Hawaii had raised
concerns about that nomination, which she described as "an affront to
the women of America" because of Judge Carswell's role in a case
upholding the refusal to employ women with children of pre-school age,
although men with children of pre-school were so employed. 88 At the
confirmation hearing, Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana asked Judge
Carswell to address "the impression that [Carswell was] not in favor of
equal rights for women." Carswell responded that he was committed to
the enforcement of the "law of the land."' 89
The Carswell nomination was rejected but not because of
Carswell's views on women's role in society. 190 The following year,
186 See Judith Resnik, From the Senate Judiciary Committee to the County Courthouse: The
Relevance of Gender, Race, and Ethnicity to Adjudication, in RACE, GENDER AND POWER TN
AMERICA 177-87 (Anita Faye Hill & Emma Coleman Jordan eds., 1995).
187 See Nomination of George Harrold Carswell of Florida, to Be an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st
Cong. (1970) [hereinafter Carswell Hearings]. One caveat: according to Mersky and Jacobstein,
supra note 140, at Preface to Vol. I, not all of the Senate Judiciary Committee proceedings during
that era have been made public.
188 Carswell Hearings, supra note 187, at 81-82. Carswell's role in that case was quite
limited; he was a member of an en banc panel that denied rehearing in Phillips v. Martin Marietta
Corp., 416 F.2d 1257 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc), in which Ida Phillips claimed that the company
had violated her Title VII rights by declining to give her, a mother of pre-school age children, ajob not denied to men with pre-school age children. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the policy
did not discriminate against women but was based upon "the differences between the normal
relationships of working fathers and working mothers to their pre-school age children." Phillips v.
Martin Marietta Corp., 411 F.2d 1, 4 (5th Cir. 1969). That decision was vacated and remanded
by the Supreme Court. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971).
189 Carswell Hearings, supra note 187, at 40-41.
190 According to one historian of the proceeding, criticism of Carswell centered on his general
lack of distinction as well as his 1948 pro-segregation stance, later repudiated. See, e.g., JOHN P.
FRANK, CLEMENT HAYNSWORTH, THE SENATE, AND THE SUPREME COURT 103-06 (1991).
Frank noted Congresswoman Mink's opposition, but in his view, the "real sticking points were
civil rights and competence." Id at 113. Frank also discussed the political context, a
democratically-controlled Senate distressed at the forced resignation of Abe Fortas, which
animated the unsuccessful nomination of Clement Haynsworth (in Frank's view, unfortunately
rejected) as well as that of Carswell (in Frank's view, appropriately rejected). Id. at xiv, 19, 28,
44, 94-95, 102-03.
In May 1970, the Senate approved, with ninety-four affirmative votes (and six absentees),
the nomination of Harry Blackmun as an associate justice. Id. at 124. No questions were
addressed to Blackmun about his views on women's rights during the brief one-day hearing.
Nomination of Harry A. Blacknun to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91 st Cong. (1970).
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when William Rehnquist and Lewis Powell were nominated to be
associate justices, several witnesses objected to both nominees' attitudes
towards women's rights. 191 While such testimony prompted Senator
Bayh to ask William Rehnquist about his views on equal rights for
women, 192 no such questions were addressed to Lewis Powell.' 93 A
nominee's attitudes toward women's rights played a minor role in the
hearings and did not become a subject of analysis by those commenting
on the nomination process.
194
191 See Nominations of William H. Rehnquist, of Arizona, and Lewis F. Powell, Jr., of
Virginia, to Be Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92nd Cong. (1971) [hereinafter Rehnquist and Powell Hearings].
Objections were raised about William Rehnquist's testimony while he was in the Justice
Department on the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) and the Women's Equality Act, id at 428-
29, and about Lewis Powell's failure, as a leader of the American Bar Association, to take stands
on issues affecting women. Id at 423-25, 428-36; see also id. at 457-60 (testimony of Catherine
G. Roraback, President of the National Lawyers' Guild, testifying that, under Powell's leadership,
the ABA was silent on the question of equal rights for women). Barbara Greene Kilberg of the
National Women's Political Caucus testified not about the nominees but about the absence of a
female nominee, id at 421-23, a topic that had been in the news, prompted in part because of
President Nixon's statements that "qualified women" should be considered for the two vacancies.
James M. Naughton, Harlan Retires, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1971, at 1.
192 In 1971, when he was Assistant Attorney General in the Nixon administration, Rehnquist
testified before the House Judiciary Committee somewhat ambiguously but in some respects
supported the ERA. See Equal Rights for Men and Women 1971: Hearings before Subcomm. No.
Four of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 323 (1971) (statement by Rep. Charles
Wiggins) (noting that while the "administration is positively committed to the support of this
constitutional amendment," it also said that the amendment was "not necessary").
When testifying as a nominee to be an associate justice before the Senate Judiciary
Committee, William Rehnquist declined to state his personal view on the ERA. When asked his
view on the rights of women under the Fourteenth Amendment, he responded that it protects
"women just as it protects other discrete minorities, if one could call women a minority."
Rehnquist and Powell Hearings, supra note 191, at 163. Thereafter, noting that some of the
issues were pending before the Court, he declined to address additional questions on women's
rights. Id. at 164.
193 According to a biography of Justice Powell, when confronted by "a group of women's
rights activists," he responded: "Ladies, I've been married for thirty-five years and have three
daughters. I've got to be for you." JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 233
(1994). As Professor Jeffries describes it, the "crucial issue was not gender but race." Id. While
Justice Powell had resigned his memberships in all-white clubs, concern was raised about his role
in the "(non)desegregation of the Richmond schools." Id. at 233-34. Justice Powell's defense
was to rely on endorsements by a variety of individuals attesting to his efforts to respond calmly
to the complex problems of school integration, his work with the all-black National Bar
Association, and his commitment to fairness. Id. at 235-36.
194 See, e.g., HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF
APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 20-22 (3d ed. 1992) (discussing the hearings without
mention of women's rights); Nomination of John Paul Stevens to Be a Justice of the Supreme
Court: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. (1975); Nomination of
Judge Antonin Scalia, to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Hearings before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. (1986) [hereinafter Scalia
Hearings]; Nomination of Justice William H. Rehnquist to Be Confirmed as Chief Justice of the
US. Supreme Court: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 114 (1986).
The nominees did not respond with detailed defenses or point to their efforts to enhance
women's participation in the political, economic, and social life of the country. Indeed, Justice
Scalia defended his membership in an all-male club on the grounds that although the club did
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The hearings on the nomination of Robert Bork, in 1987, were the
first in which women's issues moved to center stage and became
relevant to the outcome. 95 Many witnesses questioned Judge Bork's
interpretations of constitutional doctrine to exclude women from
heightened protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, 96 as well as
his decisions in non-constitutional cases. While many factors
contributed to Judge Bork's rejection, his belief that discrimination
against women was not directly prohibited by the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,197 his opposition to the Equal
Rights Amendment, 98 and his narrow construction of statutory rights
for women played an important part.
Nominations thereafter took a different turn and so has the
constitutional law, at least somewhat. Discussions in Justices Kennedy,
Scalia, and Souter's hearings addressed specifically the topic of
women's rights. 199 Justice Ginsburg was praised for her role as a
discriminate by excluding women, that form of discrimination was not "invidious." See Scalia
Hearings, supra, at 91 (commenting that a judge should not belong to a club that "practices
invidious discrimination"). Justice Scalia resigned his membership in that club; he explained that
several factors influenced his decision, including that "I was uncomfortable at doing something
which, although I thought it was perfectly OK, was offensive to friends whose feelings I am
concerned about." Id at 105.
195 See generally ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: How THE BORK NOMINATION
SHOOK AMERICA (Norton, 1989); Martin Shapiro, Interest Groups and Supreme Court
Appointments, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 935 (1990).
196 Nomination of Robert H. Bork to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 160-61 (1987)
[hereinafter Bork Hearings]. One case that received attention was Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965), which involved a challenge to a statute making it a crime to prescribe
contraceptives. Robert Bork had called the statute a "nutty law," and then, at the hearings,
described the case as an "academic exercise." Bork Hearings, supra, at 196, 240-43; Stuart
Taylor, Jr., The Bork Hearings: Bork Tells Panel He Is Not Liberal, Not Conservative, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 16, 1987, at Al. See generally Andi Rierdon, Griswold v. Connecticut: Landmark
Case Remembered, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1989, at 12CN (describing the efforts of Estelle
Griswold and Charles Lee Buxton to lobby the Connecticut legislature to repeal that law and their
subsequent arrest for operating a clinic that openly dispensed contraceptives to poor women; Yale
law professor Thomas Emerson, who had argued the case, explained its import as one of the early
recognitions of a constitutionally-based right to privacy).
197 Judge Bork argued that the Fourteenth Amendment was addressed to race and ethnicity,
not to gender, and that rules relating to race should not and could not be transposed to gender,
because "our society feels very strongly that relevant differences exist and should be respected by
government" (referring to single-sex bathrooms and women in combat). See ROBERT H. BORK,
THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAw 328-31 (1990).
198 Bork Hearings, supra note 196, at 161-62 (Bork explained that his opposition was not
heated; he had not "campaigned" against the ERA, but he did believe it would be inappropriate to
"put all the relationships between the sexes in the hand ofjudges.").
199 See Nomination ofAnthony M. Kennedy to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States, Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 23, 104-11
(1987); Scalia Hearings, supra note 194, at 168-85, 207-23, 250-75: Nomination of David H.
Souter to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 53-57, 362-406, 569-604, 684-701 (1990).
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women's rights advocate,200 and Justice Breyer expressed his support
for women's equality. 201 And, as is familiar, attitudes toward women
more generally played a role in Justice Thomas's nomination
hearings. 202
This review of some of the questions put to Supreme Court
nominees over the past two decades shows that senatorial inquiry into
"ideology" or "judicial philosophy" of nominees can play a useful role.
Up until 1970, the issues related to women's status were invisible in the
hearings. During the 1970s and through most of the 1980s, women
were but a minor footnote. The change came in the late 1980s.
Nomination hearings were one space in which the Senate helped women
to become equal rights-holders under the United States Constitution. Of
course, that work intersected with important legislative efforts-
including the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, the Family and Medical
Leave Act, and the Violence Against Women Act2 3-that generated
substantive rights. Moreover, the substance of those rights remains in
dispute. Some of the nominees who come before the Senate have
supported women's rights at only a very general level of abstraction,
with some of those confirmed voting in cases against positions
supported by women's rights advocates.
20 4
To identify some utility in the exchanges in the Senate is not to say
the Senate is always right, that the inquiry is pleasant, or that it is
effective. Indeed, despite the high profile conflict and the many
200 See Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 10-11, 27,
40, 228 (1993).
201 See Nomination of Stephen G. Breyer to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 178, 269
(1994).
202 See Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102nd Cong. 5-
26, 157-189 (testimony of Clarence Thomas); 31-157 (testimony of Anita Hill) (1991).
203 Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000)); Family and Medical Leave Act, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6
(1993) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 2601-2654 (2000 & Supp. 2002); Violence Against Women Act,
Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, 108 Stat. 1796, 1903 (1994) (codified in various sections of Titles
18, 28, and 42 (2000)).
204 Compare Nevada Dep't. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2001) (upholding
congressional power to permit private lawsuits against states for monetary remedies for violations
of the Family and Medical Leave Act) with United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)
(holding that Congress lacked power under either the Commerce Clause or the Equal Protection
Clause to enact 42 U.S.C. § 13891, the Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA)). While that section has been invalidated, the rest of VAWA remains in force, and in
2000, Congress appropriated additional funds. See the Victims of Trafficking and Violence
Against Women Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (Oct. 28, 2000). In another
decision, the Court upheld, 5-4, the constitutionality of differential treatment of children
depending on whether their mother or their father is a citizen of the United States. See Nguyen v.
INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001). See generally Post & Siegel, supra note 50; Judith Resnik, Categorical
Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 111 YALE L.J. 619 (2001).
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hearings over the last decade, the Senate rarely rejects a nominee. Far
more often, the Senate not only confirms but does so by a wide
margin-as is illustrated by Chart 5, Margins of Support for
Confirmations, 1993-2003 below.
Chart 5 Margins of Support for Confirmations, 1993-2003
Clinton I (1993-1996)
Circuit Judges District Judges
Percent Number Percent Number
Confirmed by 91-100 votes 93% 28 100% 169
61-90 votes 7% 2 0% 0
51-60 votes 0% 0 0% 0
Total Votes 199 30 169
Clinton 11 (1997-2000)
Circuit Judges District Judges
Percent Number Percent Number
Confirmed by 91-100 votes 77% 27 93% 133
61-90 votes 17% 6 6% 9
51-60 votes 6% 2 1% 1
Total Votes 178 35 143
Bush (2000-2003)
Circuit Judges District Judges
Percent Number Percent Number
Confirmed by 91-100 votes 70% 21 89% 126
61-90 votes 20% 6 11% 15
51-60 votes 10% 3 0% 0
Total Votes 171 30 141
Notes: These numbers reflect confirmations for Article Ill judgeships only, and only for those
nominees who reached the floor of the Senate. We began collecting and analyzing data for this
chart in the spring of 2004 and used the end of the calendar year 2003 as a cutoff point. Thus
excluded are those who did not get out of the Senate's Judiciary Committee because of inaction,'
vote or filibuster. Votes in the "Thomas" database are recorded as either "voice votes" or by
numbers. See Thomas: Legislative Information on the Internet, at http://thomas.loc.gov/. We
grouped all "voice votes" within the 91-100 category.
The three Clinton-nominated judges who were confirmed with less than sixty-one votes
were William A. Fletcher (9th Circuit; confirmed 57-41), Richard A. Paez (9th Circuit; confirmed
59-39), and Susan Oki Mollway (District of Hawaii; confirmed 56-34). The three Bush-
nominated judges who were confirmed with less than sixty-one votes were Dennis W. Shedd (4th
Circuit; confirmed 55-44), Jeffrey S. Sutton (6th Circuit; confirmed 52-41), and Timothy M.
Tymkovich (10th Circuit; confirmed 58-41). This chart was prepared by Judith Resnik and
Joseph Blocher.
These data could be read to demonstrate the power of the
presidency to set agendas that are difficult to counteract. That reading
636 [Vol. 26:2
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is a fair one for both of the Bush presidencies. If one knows some of
the recent history under the Clinton administration, however, one can
also read these numbers to indicate that a good deal of the negotiation
between the President and the Senate occurs before any nomination is
made.20 5 Many individuals drop out during this phase of the process,
and those whose nominations survive to make it formally to the floor
provide a skewed sample from which to assess the level of conflict.
Moreover, a history of the "blue slip" process-whereby a senator from
a home state can veto a nominee-also suggests that intra-party conflict
has played a role, with Senators seeking to affect their own party's
agenda as well as that of the opposition party.20 6  And "insider"
accounts detail idiosyncratic dealmaking, sometimes with bi-partisan
accords and other times over vehement objections.20 7 Given current
practices, two goals emerge: how to obtain and sustain senatorial
interest in less high profile nominations so as to generate serious
consideration of each nominee for a life-time appointment and how to
lower the stakes of some appointments by altering the political capital
of life-tenured judgeships.
B. Useful Interventions
In earlier essays, I proposed that the Senate turn to a supermajority
rule, requiring sixty votes as a threshold for a nomination to be
confirmed.20 8 I argued that while the Constitution does not impose that
requirement, 209 the Senate could do so in an effort to mark the import of
a life-tenured position-at all levels of the federal judicial system.
As Chart 5 above indicates, however, such a rule would not (were
other factors constant) have produced radically different results in the
last decade. During the two terms of President Clinton and up until
June of 2003 of the first term of President Bush, six persons-three
Clinton and three Bush nominees-were seated on the lower federal
205 See YALOF, supra note 138, at 191-202.
206 See Binder, Blue Slip, supra note 156, at 10-15 (focusing on the period around 1913).
207 See Sarah Wilson, Appellate Judicial Appointments During the Clinton Presidency: An
Inside Perspective, 5 J. APP. P. & PROCESS 29 (2003).
208 See Judith Resnik, Supermajority Rule, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2003, at A34; Judith Resnik,
Judicial Selection, Independent Jurists and Life Tenure, in Symposium, The Judicial
Confirmations Process: Selecting Federal Judges in the Twenty-First Century, at
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/symposium-jc/resnik.php; see also John 0. McGinnis & Michael
B. Rappaport, Supermajority Rules and the Judicial Confirmation Process, 26 CARDOZO L. REV.
543 (2004) (arguing that an express supermajority rule for Supreme Court nominations, if made
through a bi-partisan process binding future presidents, would be more desirable than one for
judges nominated to serve on the lower courts and that the Senate Judiciary ought to use a
supermajority rule if declining to forward a nominee to the Senate).
209 See also GERHARDT, supra note 13, at 41 (detailing the other instances in which "stiffer
procedural requirements" are imposed by the Constitution).
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courts by votes of fewer than sixty. More recently, in several instances,
opponents of a few nominees have used a filibuster, but two of those
judges were then seated as recess appointments. While these vivid
conflicts have dominated the press in recent years, more than ninety
percent of those nominated in the last decade for the lower courts have
been confirmed with support of ninety or more senators. Hence, my
concern is that the Senate has been too accommodating, approving too
many candidates, too quickly.
A supermajority rule of sixty could nonetheless have some use.
Such a requirement could create incentives for the President to put forth
individuals about whom a broad consensus of approval exists. The rule
would have its most powerful impact at the Supreme Court level, where
the stakes are the highest. Further, this relatively modest
"supermajority" would not over-empower a senatorial "fringe" (as forty
senators represent a significant part of American political opinion) but
would likely generate movement towards a middle ground. Also, a
supermajority rule would underscore senatorial commitment to the
constitutional role of "Advice and Consent. '210
Another option is for the President and Senate to work together by
relying on bi-partisan merit selection procedures. In addition to models
from other countries, many states use forms of merit selection.21'
Further, regulations governing the selection of federal magistrate judges
require that screening panels, composed of a variety of kinds of persons,
play a role in vetting nominees. In the spring of 2003, Senator Charles
Schumer, a Democrat from New York, made such a proposal. He
suggested that the Senate and President create nominating commissions
for each state and each federal circuit, to be composed of an equal
number of members chosen by the President and by the opposition
party's Senate leader. The nominating commissions would have the
power to propose a single candidate for each vacancy that the President
was obliged to nominate absent "evidence" that a candidate was "unfit
for judicial service. ' 212 The White House objected that such a process
would "transfer the nomination power of the President and the
confirmation power of the Senate to a group of unelected and
unaccountable private citizens. '213
210 Bruce Ackerman has also suggested supermajority rules, as well as that staggered and fixed
terms be used, with two appointments to be made at a time. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE
FUTURE OF LIBERAL REVOLUTION 104-12 (1992) (relying heavily on examples from selection
procedures for Germany's constitutional court).
211 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-44(a) (2004); Connecticut General Assembly Legislative
Program Review & Investigations Committee, Staff Briefing: Judicial Selection (Sept. 14, 2000)
(summarizing the history of the creation of a judicial selection commission, and the selection
process through a twelve-person committee including six lawyers and six non-lawyers, who
generate lists of recommended candidates).
212 Schumer Proposal, supra note 4, at 2.
213 Letter from Counsel to the President Alberto R. Gonzales to Senator Charles E. Schumer
[Vol. 26:2
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As this exchange suggests, independent commissions have appeal
precisely because they devolve powers of appointment that are held
directly by political branches to another level. To do so-as some states
have in their "merit selection" mechanisms-requires placing faith
either in experts or in group-based processes to generate a search for
qualities in prospective judges that may make them wise judges but not
necessarily attractive to more politically-engaged appointing bodies.
The very devolution, however, also can be criticized for producing a
selection process less "democratic" than is the appointment of judges by
elected officials. Moreover, what power is in fact delegated turns on the
details of particular nomination commissions, which vary in their
compositions and their ability to constrain the range of options of the
elected branches. Yet another dimension is the degree of publicity
surrounding nominations, as the lobbyists now attuned to the President
and Senate could aim their persuasive efforts in other directions or
attempt to affect the reputations of individuals under consideration.
Another way to try to lower the political heat in the United States
would be to increase the number of life-tenured judgeships. The very
small number of positions makes an appointment a real "political plum"
that vests significant power in relatively few individuals. The appellate
courts are now both the end point for most cases and the pool from
which Supreme Court nominees are drawn. Were hundreds more
selected for life-tenured slots, 2 14 the power of life tenure would be
shared by more people and each individual appointment would become
less significant.
Of course, the more judgeships with life tenure, the less unique the
job. The job might lose some of its cachet and therefore attract a
somewhat different pool. But the tradeoff could enable a shift in the
understanding of a judge's job away from the glamour of policymaking
and towards the more mundane, record-driven activity of applying law
to fact. When done properly, adjudication is a labor-intensive job,
requiring a kind of work that is time-consuming and sometimes tedious.
We want candidates for judgeships to be committed to doing that form
of work-much of it without high visibility yet having profound effects
on specific litigants.
Yet another tack is to the return to the text of Article III, stating
that the "judicial Power of the United States" shall vest in courts with
judges holding "their Offices during good Behaviour. '215  The
Constitution does not directly address the question of what "good
Regarding the Judicial Nomination Process (May 6, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
olp/judicialnominations.htm.
214 For example, the seven hundred magistrate and bankruptcy judge positions could be turned
into life-tenured jobs, with an accompanying expansion of appellate judgeships.
215 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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Behaviour" means. Commentators, however, have. Professor Raoul
Berger traced the phrase "hold their Offices during good Behaviour" to
the Act of Settlement of 1701 (which protected the independence of
English judges by granting them tenure "as long as they conduct[ed]
themselves well, and provided for termination" only through a formal
request by the Crown of the two Houses of Parliament) and to earlier
English traditions.216 Prompted by efforts in the 1960s to oust Justice
William O'Douglas from his seat on the United States Supreme Court,
academic commentary of that era focused on the kind of activity that
would justify removal of a sitting judge. 217 Professor Berger argued that
Congress had the power to define a breach of "good behavior" to
include more than "high Crimes and Misdemeanors," 218 while others
disagreed. A similar debate about the flexibility of Article III's text
took place in the late 1970s, when members of Congress considered
how to impose sanctions short of impeachment on Article III judges and
how to facilitate the retirement or removal of judges too disabled to
work.2 19 A statute, the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980,
followed thereafter and has survived a few challenges to its
constitutionality.220
The doctrinal issue of interest to me, in contrast, is to revisit
Article III to consider whether, were Congress to provide a fixed term
for all sitting federal judges, such a provision could be read to be
constitutional. The answer depends in part on the form of constitutional
analysis that one embraces. One could, for example, quest after the
original understanding of some of the framers about the length of tenure
assumed to be comprehended. One inquiry would be whether "good
behavior" ever had a temporal limit.221 One might also look for other
instances in English law when the phrase "holding office during good
behavior" was used. Alternatively, one could attempt to use the average
length of service of judges and justices over the early years as a
216 Raoul Berger, Impeachment of Judges and "Good Behavior" Tenure, 79 YALE L.J. 1475,
1478 (1970).
217 Id. at 1475-77.
218 Id. at 1530; see also Burke Shartel, Federal Judges-Appointment, Supervision, and
Removal-Some Possibilities Under the Constitution, 28 MICH. L. REV. 870 (1930); Note,
Removal of Federal Judges: A Proposed Plan, 31 ILL. L. REV. 631 (1937).
219 See The National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal Report (1993). See
generally Stephen B. Burbank, Procedural Rulemaking Under the Judicial Councils Reform and
Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 283 (1982); Symposium,
Disciplining the Federal Judiciary, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1-1430 (1993).
220 See The Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-458 (codified at
various sections of Title 28 and, as amended, at 28 U.S.C. § 372 (2000)); see Hastings v. Judicial
Conference of the United States, 657 F. Supp. 672 (D.D.C. 1986), aff'd in part and rev 'd in part,
829 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1014 (1988); Hastings v. United States, 837
F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C. 1993).
221 See, e.g., Berger, supra note 216, at 1478 (suggesting that seventeenth century sources
assumed the holding of a position for life if the office holder behaved himself).
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benchmark of what length of tenure in fact flowed.
The existence of the statutory federal judiciary (with magistrate
and bankruptcy judges sitting inside Article III but lacking life tenure) is
evidence that this part of the Constitution is not one in which forms of
originalism or textualism have had much sway. Rather, a majority of
the Court has been decidedly functionalist as it has read Article III to
permit devolution of judicial power in a manner unthinkable only
decades ago. Thus, just as over this past century reinterpretation has
permitted much of the "judicial Power of the United States" that the
words of the Constitution appear to mandate vesting in courts with life-
tenured judges to be delegated to non-life-tenured jurists in courts and
in agencies, 222 Article III could similarly be reinterpreted to require
guaranteed terms yet also to permit a mandatory, statutorily-fixed
retirement age. Congress could enact such a statute with prospective
application, such that current judges would not lose their seats, thereby
avoiding any arguments that it would diminish the salary or otherwise
impair the independence of sitting jurists.
An alternative is to enact legislation creating great incentives for
judges to serve shorter terms. As Professor Yoon has detailed,223 the
current federal judicial pension system prompts some judges to take
"senior status" but to continue to serve. Congress could do more by
providing significantly better pension benefits to those judges who sit
no longer than fifteen years. Economic models could assist in how to
fashion an optimal intervention, just as some universities have offered
packages of benefits and salary that have prompted tenured professors
to take early retirement. My suggestions join many others,224 all
concerned that the federal system's life tenure, while initially attractive
for its protection of judicial independence, has been shown to place
stress on democratic premises of limited charters to government
officials.
222 1 map the doctrinal revision in Resnik, Inventing the District Courts, supra note 30, at 625-
48.
223 See Yoon, Understanding Turnover, supra note 112 (finding that the availability of
pension rights is a key variable in a lower court judge's decision to take senior status).
224 See, e.g., Garrow, supra note 118 (arguing that, given a number of justices who served on
the Supreme Court but were ill, a requirement for retirement is appropriate). Another suggestion,
proposed by Professors Paul Carrington and Roger Cramton, would be a legislative provision that
endowed each Congress, every two years, with the power to appoint justices who would rotate on
the Court that would sit as a body of nine. See Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, The
Supreme Court Renewal Act: A Return to Basic Principles (Jan. 2, 2005) (memorandum, on file
with author).
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VII. AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM, ONE HOPES
This description of the United States system has, I hope, shown its
cultural specificity. Questions then remain about what lessons are to be
drawn abroad. A first is that one can (if one wants) use the judicial
appointments process as a platform to score points with constituencies
in a democracy. Indeed, given the import of the work of judiciaries in
democracies, the potential to exploit the political dimensions of judicial
appointments and to generate conflict is high. The form that conflicts
take will vary, depending on the concerns of the participants, the
technology for dissemination of information, and the particular topics
prompting normative debate.
A second lesson is that a decision to revise selection methods is
itself a political moment. For example, academics had for some time
criticized the appointments process in Canada for having a "democratic
deficit" stemming from a lack of "transparency" in the process and from
the centralization of authority.225 But it was not until the spring of
2004, as a Prime Minister of Canada faced reelection in the wake of
attacks about his party's policies and as some of his opponents hoped to
use opposition to gay marriage as way to garner votes, 22 6 that a
modicum of change occurred.2 27 Instead of simply announcing the
225 See, e.g., Peter H. Russell, A Parliamentary Approach to Reforming the Process of Filling
Vacancies on the Supreme Court of Canada, Submission to the Standing Committee on Justice,
Human Rights, Public Safety, and Emergency Preparedness (March 23, 2004), available at
http://www.churchillsociety.org/A%20Parliamentary%2OApproach.htm; Jacob Ziegel, Merit
Selection and Democratization of Appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada, 5 CHOICES:
CTS. & LEGIS. 3 (1999), available at http://www.irpp.org/choices/archive/vol5no.2.pdf.
226 Several of the provincial courts have found the denial of marriage for same-sex couples to
violate the Canadian Charter of Rights. See, e.g., Dunbar v. Yukon Territory [2004] Y.J. No. 61
(Y.T.S.C.); EGALE Canada, Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] B.C.J. 1582; Halpem v.
Toronto (City), [2003] D.L.R. 529. The Government drafted a same-sex marriage provision that
it sent to the Supreme Court. See Tonda MacCharles, Same-Sex Bill Stalled, TORONTO STAR,
Oct. 2, 2004, at Al.
In December 2004, the Canadian Supreme Court upheld in principle the right of
individuals of the same sex to marry each other but did not specifically address how Parliament
was to implement it. See Reference re Same-Sex Marriage [2004] S.C.C. 79. By that time, "six
of the provinces and one territory, representing 85 percent of the population, had already decided"
that limiting marriage to a man and a woman was unconstitutional. See Clifford Krassu,
Canada's Supreme Court Clears Way for Same-Sex Marriage Law, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2004,
at A7.
227 The May 2004 House of Commons Report suggested interim alterations for the then two
pending nominations. See Standing Committee on Justice, Human Rights, Public Safety and
Emergency Preparedness, Improving the Supreme Court of Canada Appointments Process, House
of Commons, Canada (May, 2004), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/committee/Committee
Publications.aspx?Sourceld+84157. The report called for the Minister of Justice to appear in
public to "explain the process" and for the government to "publish a document setting out the
current process" for Supreme Court justice appointments. As to the longer term, the Report
proposed the establishment of an advisory committee to compile lists of candidates and to
forward "in confidence" a list of three to five candidates to the Minister of Justice who would
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appointment of a new justice to the Supreme Court, the Attorney
General appeared before Parliament to explain the process and then the
choices made. This revision was a means of responding to concerns
about problems in the administration not directly related to the
judiciary, just as the debate about judicial selection was a means of
questioning the Prime Minister. 228
Thus, whenever pressures are mounting for changing techniques of
selection, one needs to analyze the politics prompting movements for
reform. Who is calling for change and what is the problem that needs to
be remediated? In England, Wales, and Canada, criticism has been
aimed at the degree of power held by the Prime Minister who, under the
current system, appoints the judges in each country. 229 But, as detailed
above, what fueled a small change in Canada were the political needs of
a party in power. Similarly, in England, pressures on methods of
judicial selection come from a variety of sources. Some are concerned
about the lack of diversity of the judiciary, 230 challenged for being less
legitimate because its members came from too narrow a slice of society
to have the knowledge and experience sufficient to render wise
judgment on the wide array of claims brought. Others worry that the
English system of Law Lords does not fit within European principles of
separated powers. 231
But again, one cannot explain how particular changes come into
retain authority to decide. Id. at 6-8. Thereafter, a public session would be held to explain the
reasons for the persons selected.
One dissenting Report proposed "public review of a short list of nominees before a
parliamentary committee." Id. at 15-16. Another dissent from the "Bloc Quebecois" called for
making the process "more democratic" by having provinces or regions submit lists of potential
candidates; also requested was the establishment of an advisory committee and the imposition of
limits on prime ministerial authority by requiring selection from short lists. Id. at 17-20. The
New Democratic Party, also dissenting focused on "enhancing the open, transparent and
democratic nature of the process" by calling for the Minister of Justice to appear before an
appointment was made and for further specification of the membership and role of the Advisory
Committee proposed. Id. at 21-23.
228 See Kathleen Harris, PM Is 'Mad as Hell': Scandal Sends Liberals Spiralling in Polls,
TORONTO SUN, Feb. 15, 2004, at 4 (discussing Prime Minister Martin's response to the
"sponsorship scandal" claimed to have sent one hundred million dollars to advertising firms
supportive of the Liberal party); see also Kim Lunman, MPs Working on Hearings for Top-Court
Nominees, GLOBE & MAL, Aug. 23, 2004, at A4 (noting that the pressure was to fill
appointments in time for the hearing in the fall on "the controversial same-sex marriage issue").
229 Technically, the appointments come from the Queen through her Governor General, who
follows the Prime Minister's advice. See Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., ch. S-26, § 4(2) (1985)
(Can.) (specifying that justices are to be appointed "by the Governor in Council by letters patent
under the Great Seal").
230 See Kenney, supra note 2 (discussing the appointment of Brenda Hale, the first woman to
be a Law Lord); House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitutional Reform Bill,
Constitutional Reform Bill [HL], Vol. 1, Report 82-85 (HL Paper 125-I) (July 2, 2004).
231 Concern about separation of powers predates this particular issue. See ROBERT STEVENS,
THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY: THE VIEW FROM THE LORD CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE
(1993).
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being only by reference to such concerns. The proposal for a new
method of appointment of judges was coupled with a proposal to
abolish the Office of Lord Chancellor and to create a Supreme Court for
England. Many attribute the timing of the proposals to the governing
party's interest in shifting attention away from yet other controversial
decisions. Similarly, opposition to these changes are based on eclectic
arguments from whether an appointing commission will be more
"political" than decisions made through the office of the prime
minister 232 to suggestions that the assent of sitting judges depended
upon being given a new court building suitable to their needs. 233 In
short, reforming judicial selection is a political event that may---or may
not-be centrally "about" judicial selection. Only by insisting on an
articulation of the reasons behind reform pressures can one understand
why changes occur and can one assess whether to be enthusiastic about
them.
A third lesson is that as principles of democracies themselves
evolve, methods for selection of judges that were once perceived to be
legitimate may need to be revisited. Increased demands for deliberative
representation within democracies have prompted insistence-in many
countries-that not all judges be white or male or of a certain class.
When the content and import of equality changes, processes once seen
as unproblematic become questionable.
Fourth, democratic premises are relevant not only to the question
of selection but also to the length of service enjoyed by judges and the
range of choice that judges have over their own workload. I have
argued that judges in the United States who have life tenure and who
hold the power to make so much law for so long have too much power.
Built into adjudication is the capacity for revision through the case law
method. As the composition of judiciaries change, the wisdom of a
particular rule of law can be tested, in that new members of high courts
may not adhere to its premises. But that very capacity to generate
change depends on limiting the length of service of powerful judges.
Furthermore, the obligatory quality of adjudication is another
source of constraint-making me leery of supreme courts that have
unfettered discretion to pick all their cases. When high courts have
broad jurisdictional mandates rather than exclusive devotion to
constitutional cases, judges are required to hear the "dull" or "ordinary"
private and public disputes as well as more vivid moments of norm
232 See Robert Stevens, Reform in Haste and Repent at Leisure: Iolanthe, the Lord High
Executioner, and Brave New World, in CONSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION, supra note 2, at 1, 28-35.
233 See, for example, the discussion and exchange between two members of the House of
Commons, Vera Baird, and Alan James Beith, in Hansard, House of Commons, Westminster
Hall, Vol. 421, Column 499WH, at Columns 503-505WH (May 27, 2004), available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk.
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development. A mixed docket both informs those who sit on a high
court about workings of law in a range of situations and insulates a
court from being understood only through its high profile constitutional
work.
Fifth, to the extent that "transparency" has become a buzzword in
debates in England, Canada, and the United States, comparing the
current rules and practices of the different countries illuminates various
ways in which that aspiration can be materialized in judiciaries. For
example, one can watch through televised broadcasts the arguments
before the Supreme Court of Canada. England is starting to experiment
with televised court proceedings. 234 In Australia, the current practice is
to allow many appellants petitioning for High Court review to have
twenty minutes of oral arguments to a panel of the Court to explain why
the Court should take the case.235 Further, in the Canadian system, the
possibility of a legislative override on judicial decisionmaking puts
democracy back into play in a way that ought to reduce anxiety about
judicial decisionmaking.2 36 In contrast, in the United States, nominees
are questioned in public but once seated, the justices make their own
rules on practice and procedure and have, thus far, refused to permit
televised proceedings for oral arguments.
Sixth, judicial legitimacy and independence is an artifact of culture
as much as of text. In the United States, the constitutional guarantees of
life tenure, salary protections, and due process have developed a
presumption of an independent and impartial judiciary. Yet, in the
United States, judges have often been attacked for their decisions and
legislators have frequently proposed curbing their powers. While some
234 Patrick E. Tyler, World Briefing-Europe:Britain: Court to Let in Cameras As a Test, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 1, 2004, at A10.
235 Before the winter of 2000, that opportunity was universal. See AuSn. HIGH CT. R. 41.1
(providing that two justices may determine an application for leave to appeal without listing the
case for oral argument but that when an application is listed for argument, each side has
arguments of about twenty minutes). In the summer of 2004, some members of the Court
proposed reconsidering this practice as a means of conserving time. Revisions, to take effect in
January of 2005, give the High Court discretion (exercised through agreement by two justices of
the seven sitting on the High Court) to deny leave without oral argument. See id. at 41.11.1
("Any two Justices may determine an application without listing it for hearing .... "). As of this
writing, the expectation is that many litigants will continue to be able to argue the application
orally but that applications that lack merit on their face will be denied on the papers. E-mail from
the Hon. Justice Michael Kirby to Professor Judith Resnik, Jan. 5, 2005 (on file with author).
About 730 "special leave applications" (which are not the exclusive route to the High Court) were
filed in 2003-2004, which constituted an increase of about 120 petitions from the year before.
See HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA, ANNUAL REPORT 2003-2004, Part VII, Annexure B (Tables of
Judicial Workload) at Chart 2 (Categories of Matters Filed in All Jurisdictions); High Court of
Australia Act, 1979. The High Court rendered more than 460 full court decisions related to a
variety of matters. Id. at Chart 14 (Categories of Full Court Decisions Related to Matters Filed in
All Jurisdictions).
236 CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Charter of Rights and Freedoms), § 33,
discussed supra note 48.
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proponents of American-style constitutionalism claim that Article III is
the paragon and paradigm of judicial independence, the kind of
aggression against judges in the United States comes as a surprise to
judges and lawyers in other common law countries. Specifically, the
last ten years have been a period of particularly energetic efforts by
Congress to restrain judicial action. In 1996, Congress limited judicial
review of certain kinds of cases involving immigrants 237 and
constrained judges' powers when dealing with cases about conditions in
prisons. 238  In 2003, Congress reduced judicial discretion on
sentencing.239
In 2004, members of Congress proposed bills to take jurisdiction
away from federal courts in disputes involving God, the Ten
Commandments, and the Pledge of Allegiance.2 40 Another proposal
was to instruct federal judges not to employ foreign law, 241 and yet
another was to provide for congressional override, through
supermajorities, of judicial decisions. 242  In addition, members of
Congress have regularly called for redesigning the boundaries of
circuits and reorganizing courts to alter the composition of the group of
judges sitting and thereby affect outcomes.243 While most of these bills
are not likely to pass and some are not likely to be constitutional, they
are introduced not for their legal merit but for their political content.
They are also aimed at inhibiting judges, and some of the life-tenured
judges in turn complain that they are under siege.244 In some states, a
similar pattern of hostility has emerged as courts issue controversial
237 See the Illegal Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L.
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified in scattered sections of Titles 8, 18, and 42 U.S.C.
(2000)). A divided Court found that this act limited the Supreme Court's jurisdiction less than its
drafters may have thought. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
238 See Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321,
(1996) (codified at scattered sections of 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C. (2000))
239 See Protect Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-201, 117 Stat. 650 (2003). The provision so
doing was called the "Feeney Amendment" after its sponsor, who added it as a rider to the bill.
240 See, e.g., the Constitutional Restoration Act of 2004, H.R. 3799, 108th Cong. (2004). One
such bill, The Pledge Protection Act of 2004, H.R. 2028, 108th Cong. (2004), was passed by the
House of Representatives on September 23, 2004. See 150 CONG. REC. D940-01, *D940.
241 See The Reaffirmation of American Independence Resolution, H. R. Res. 568, 108th Cong.
(2004).
242 See Congressional Accountability for Judicial Activism Act of 2004, H.R. 3920, 108th
Cong. (2004).
243 See, e.g., Ninth Circuit Judgeships and Reorganization Act of 2004, S. 2278, 108th
Congress (April 1, 2004) (proposed by Senators Ensign and Craig).
244 See William H. Rehnquist, 2003 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, 35 THIRD
BRANCH 1, 4 (Special Issue, Jan. 2004) (raising concerns about an "unwarranted and ill-
considered effort to intimidate independent judges in the performance of their judicial duties");
see also Mary Ann Vial Lemmon, Chair's Column Federal Trial News 18-19 (ABA Judicial
Division Fall, 2004). Judge Lemmon commented: "Judicial independence is in danger on many
fronts.... Judge-bashing has become an acceptable means of attracting public attention to some
elected officials, both state and federal, irrespective of the fairness of the criticism."
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rulings and legislators object.245
I began this article with a call for context, and I must end with one
as well. Judicial legitimacy rests on practices that promote and cherish
fair judgment, that respect individual judgments when rendered after
deliberation, that accord judges sufficient discretion to make
particularized decisions, that oblige judges to take responsibility for
their decisions through explanation and publication, and that constrain
judges when they move outside their role of adjudication. That culture
is currently at risk in the United States in part but by no means
exclusively through efforts to put individuals into judgeships because of
their views on specific rights and the role of government.
Courts are institutions very much expressive of the social orders in
which they sit. Efforts to change courts need always to be appreciated
for the many agendas accompanying them. As I explained at the outset,
democracy is at work in requiring access to justice and in seeking a
justice system populated by independent judges constrained by the rule
of law and committed to individual rights. Democratic principles render
the right to hold public judgeships through inheritance or solely because
of one's skin color or sex intolerable. But, as I have also argued,
democratic theory alone does not get one to a requirement to change
any particular system for selecting judges. Moreover, while interest in
changing selection systems may come from those concerned about the
structure of authority more generally, the energy to make changes
usually comes from those who hope that through changed processes
come changes in the people selected to judge and therefore in the
judgments made.
245 See, e.g., Mark C. Miller, Court-Legislative Conflict in Massachusetts, 88 JUDICATURE 97,
99 (2004) (arguing that after decades of a "cooperative relationship" between the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts and that state's legislature, a more contentious relationship has
emerged, in part because the court has become less "subservient" and more "independent").
647
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APPENDIX: METHODOLOGICAL NOTE ON ASSESSING THE LENGTHS OF
JUDICIAL SERVICE, 1800s/2000s*
A. Overview
The data in Chart 4 are drawn entirely from an online database,
Federal Judicial History Office of the Federal Judicial Center. Federal
Judges Biographical Database, available at http://www.fjc.gov. These
data have been used by others, including Albert Yoon, Love's Labor
Lost? Judicial Tenure Among Federal Court Judges: 1945-2000, 91
Cal. L. Rev. 1029 (2003).
Chart 4 compares three periods in American history: January 1,
1789 to December 31, 1809; January 1, 1833 to December 31, 1853;
and January 1, 1983 to December 31, 2003. For the first period, 1789-
1809, we looked at the length of service of sixteen Supreme Court
justices and forty-seven lower court judges. For the second period,
1833-1853, we looked at the length of service of nine Supreme Court
justices and thirty-six lower court judges. For the third period, 1983-
2003, we looked at the length of service of six Supreme Court justices
and 530 lower court judges.
For the period between January 1, 1789 and December 31, 1809,
Chart 4 includes all judges who received their commissions after having
been confirmed as well as all judges who took their seats through recess
appointments between those two dates. Excluded, as is explained
below, are judges who served for one year on special courts established
in 1801 and abolished in 1802. For the other two periods, Chart 4
includes all judges whose service was terminated between the dates
specified.
We began by using two different selection methods because we
wanted to see the change from the country's beginnings to the most
recent time. Whereas we have a fixed point of entry for the first two
decades of the country's existence, we have no similar metric for the
more recent years because individuals are continually being appointed
to the bench and many appointed in the last decades are still sitting. By
using the date of the termination of service within these twenty years,
we were able to collect a sample of judges whose terms had starting and
stopping points.
Because of these two different forms of assembling groups of
judges, a concern exists that the results stem from the variation in
methodology. To respond, we assembled a third set of judges in the
early years by using the same technique that we used to assemble the
twentieth century pool. We looked at any judge whose service had
* The Appendix is co-authored by Judith Resnik and Steven Wu, Yale Law School, Class of
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ended, either between 1833 and 1853 or between 1983 and 2003. We
selected the 1833 to 1853 period to have an early twenty-year span that
pre-dated the Civil War. Of course, the major factor-that a radically
different number of individuals served during the nineteenth and the
twentieth centuries-remains.
For all sets of judges selected for analysis, the length of tenure was
calculated as the amount of time between when a judge received his or
her commission or was appointed during a recess and when his or her
service was terminated. Our interest is to understand how long
individuals hold the power of federal judgment at the trial and appellate
levels. Therefore, for this chart, we treated "termination" of a judge's
service as a term of art. With the few exceptions noted below (mostly
for multiple, continuous, or discontinuous terms), "termination" means
that the judge's service was ended for any of a number of reasons
including death, resignation, retirement, impeachment or conviction,
failure to be confirmed after a recess appointment had been made, or
promotion to the Supreme Court.
We do not consider a judge's service to have been terminated if
that judge was promoted from a district court to a court of appeals or if
a judge on either a district or circuit court changed his or her status from
active to senior. Because research on the work of federal judges who
take senior status indicates that a substantial proportion of them
continues to have relatively full dockets, we included as part of their
overall term any time they spent as "senior" judges as well as the time
they spent as "active" judges. Given this definition, our database does
not include sixty-three judges who, during the period 1983-2003, were
promoted from the district court to the court of appeals where they are
currently sitting.I Therefore, our analysis differs from that of the
Federal Judicial Center database, which considers these judges to have
had their district court terms "terminated."
Albert Yoon, who has also looked at judicial tenure, used a
different measure for termination. Professor Yoon considered a federal
I Those sixty-three judges are: Bobby Ray Baldock, Maryanne Trump Barry, Alice Moore
Batchelder, C. Arlen Beam, Michael Boudin, Jose Cabranes, Edith Brown Clement Robert E.
Cowen, Emmett Ripley Cox, Conrad Keefe Cyr, W. Eugene Davis, Joel Frederick Dubina, John
Malcolm Duhe Jr., Terence Thomas Evans, Ferdinand Francis Fernandez, Joel Martin Flaum,
Emilio M. Garza, Julia Smith Gibbons, Ralph B. Guy, Jr., Cynthia Hall, Clyde H. Hamilton,
David Rasmussen Hansen, Karen LeCraft Henderson, Frank M. Hull, Michael Stephen Kanne,
Andrew Jay Kleinfeld, Edward Leavey, Pierre Leval, Stanley Marcus, Joseph Michael
McLaughlin, Herbert Theodore Milbum, Roger Jeffrey Miner, Diana E. Murphy, Paul Victor
Niemeyer, Donald Eugene O'Brien, Richard A. Paez, Barrington Daniels Parker, Jr., Rosemary S.
Pooler, John Carbone Porfilio, Edward Charles Prado, Reena Raggi, Johnnie Rawlinson, Marjorie
0. Rendell, Jane Richards Roth, Ilana Rovner, Pamela Rymer, Anthony Scirica, Bruce Selya,
David Sentelle, Dennis Shedd, Eugene Edward Siler Jr., D. Brooks Smith, Sonia Sotomayor,
Norman H. Stahl, Walter King Stapleton, Richard Fred Suhrheinrich, A. Wallace Tashima, Juan
Torruella, William Traxler, John Mercer Walker, Jr., Kim Wardlaw, William Walter Wilkins,
Anne Claire Williams.
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judge to have "terminated" a term if he or she "permanently leave[s]
one level of the court after being elevated to a higher court (for
example, district court to circuit court)."'2 However, Professor Yoon's
article was not concerned with the length of judicial tenure; rather,
Yoon sought to explain why judges chose to leave the bench, either for
non-judicial activities or for a higher judicial office. Our definition of
"termination" more closely aligns with Chart 4's goal of describing the
length of time during which judges hold and exercise judicial power.
In our methodology, Supreme Court justices are governed by
slightly different rules with regard to the meaning of "termination." A
lower court judge's promotion to the Supreme Court constitutes a
termination of that judge's lower court service. The rationale for
counting a switch from the lower court to the Supreme Court as a
termination of the lower-court term is that the two jobs are significantly
different. When measuring the length of service of justices on the
Supreme Court, we counted the taking of senior status to constitute
termination. The rationale for including the taking of senior status is
that Supreme Court justices who assume senior status no longer exercise
power on the Supreme Court.
Finally, given that length of service could be related to the age at
which an individual is appointed and/or the length of a person's life, we
also learned about the average age of appointments as well as the
average longevity of the group of people we assessed. As Chart 4
makes plain, individuals have been appointed to serve at the lower
courts at relatively young ages, ranging from an average of 43 years of
age in 1789-1809 to an average of 52 years between 1983-2003. The
average length of life has grown as well, from 64 years (1789-1809) to
75 years (1983-2003). One other note is in order. In a few instances,
we did not know a date of birth but knew the year; we used July 1 as the
midpoint of the year to make the calculation. In one instance, we knew
no information about the age of a judge (Philip Kissick Lawrence) and
excluded him from the analysis. Of course, judges now living but who
stopped serving as of 2003 are not part of the average of the length of
life for that period. Thus, of some 530 individuals, about 100 were not
included in the average on longevity. If a judge served on both the lower
and the Supreme Court, we included that person twice for the "average
age at death" calculation as we measured each of those services
independently.
2 Albert Yoon, Love's Labor Lost? Judicial Tenure Among Federal Court Judges: 1945-
2000, 91 CAL. L. REv. 1029, 1043 n.64 (2003).
[Vol. 26:2
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B. Applications and Examples
In order for readers to see how the above methodological decisions
affect the data, we provide a few examples below of the specific choices
we made.
1. For judges who served terms on different or reorganized courts
at the same level, who assumed chief judge positions, or who served
terms on both district and appellate courts, we added the length of the
various terms. This group included: (a) judges who moved from one
court to another court at the same level; (b) judges who assumed a chief
judgeship of a court; (c) judges whose courts were reconfigured during
their term of service; and (d) judges who moved from the district court
to the court of appeals.
a. 1789-1809
Example: William Cranch served as a circuit court judge from
3/3/1801 to 2/24/1806, then as chief judge of that circuit from 2/24/1806
to 9/1/1855. These two periods are counted together for purposes of
this database, so Cranch is considered to have served between 3/3/1801
and 9/1/1855 (54.53 years).
Example: John McNairy served as a district court judge in the
District of Tennessee from 2/20/1797 to 4/29/1802, when his service
was terminated and he was reassigned to be a district judge on the
Eastern and Western Districts of Tennessee, where he served from
4/29/1802 to 9/1/1833. Judge McNairy's term is counted as running
from 2/20/1797 to 9/1/1833 (36.55 years).
b. 1983-2003
Example: For the period 1983-2003, many judges were reassigned
due to the split of the Fifth Circuit into the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits:
the judges involved in that split do not have their terms counted
separately.
Example: Bailey Aldrich served as a district judge from 4/27/1954
to 9/14/1959, and then was promoted to the circuit court where he
served until 9/25/2002. For this database, Judge Aldrich's tenure on
two levels of the federal judiciary is counted as running together from
4/27/1954 to 9/25/2002, or 48.45 years.
2. If a judge served discontinuous terms or served several
consecutive terms, each of which ended in termination, we also added
these different terms together.
HeinOnline -- 26 Cardozo L. Rev.  651 2004-2005
CARDOZO LA W REVIEW
Example: Dominic Augustin Hall served three discontinuous
terms: 12/11/1804 to 4/30/1812, 6/1/1812 to 2/22/1813, and 6/1/1813 to
12/19/1820. Rather than counting each of his terms separately, for the
purposes of this database, Judge Hall is counted as serving 15.7 years,
the sum of his three discontinuous terms.
Example: Roy Winfield Harper was appointed during a recess
several times and was not confirmed by the Senate (8/7/1947-
12/19/1947, 12/20/1947-6/22/1948); the lack of a senatorial
confirmation automatically led to the termination of Judge Harper's
recess appointment each time, but he was immediately re-appointed to
the bench. Judge Harper was ultimately confirmed after his third recess
appointment on 6/22/1948 and served thereafter for several decades.
For the purposes of this database, Judge Harper's three continuous
terms are counted as one single term.
3. If a judge was promoted to the Supreme Court within the
relevant time periods, then his service on each court is counted
separately: that is, the service on all lower courts is counted as one
tenure length, and the service on the Supreme Court (starting from when
that judge receives a commission to serve on the Supreme Court and
ending when his service at the Supreme Court is terminated) is
measured separately.
Example: Harry Blackmun served as a circuit court judge from
8/18/1959 to 6/8/1970, then served as a Supreme Court justice from
5/14/1970 to 3/4/1999. Rather than counting his two tenures together,
his service as a Supreme Court justice is counted separately. Therefore,
the database only includes Justice Blackmun's tenure on the Supreme
Court-5/14/1970 to 3/4/1999. Because his service on the appellate
court terminated prior to 1983, it is not counted.
Example: Ruth Bader Ginsburg served as a circuit court judge from
6/18/1980 to 8/9/1993, and has served as a Supreme Court justice since
then. Rather than counting her two terms together, her service as a
Supreme Court justice is counted separately. Therefore, the database
only includes Justice Ginsburg's tenure on the circuit court-6/18/1980
to 8/9/1993. Because she continues to serve on the Supreme Court, her
service is not included.
4. The termination date of Supreme Court justices is determined
by either the time they take senior status or the time their service is
terminated, whichever is earlier.
Example: Thurgood Marshall took senior status on 10/1/1991, but
his service was only terminated (due to death) on 1/24/1993. Because
652 [Vol. 26:2
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Justice Marshall neither authored nor joined any opinions after
10/1/1991 (he joined his last opinion on 6/27/1991), this database
counts his service as terminating on 10/1/1991. Clarence Thomas, the
successor to Justice Marshall's seat, began his service on 10/17/1991.
Example: As a result of this rule, Potter Stewart is not included in
the database even though his service was terminated between 1983 and
2003. Justice Stewart's service was terminated on 12/7/1985; however,
he took senior status on 7/3/1981, which falls outside of the 1983-2003
range. Because the database only includes judges or justices whose
terms effectively end between 1983-2003, Justice Stewart is not
included.
C. Methodological Issues Specific to a Time Period
1. 1789-1809. As is familiar to those involved with the federal
courts, special legislation in 1801 created special federal courts that
were abolished the year afterward. 3 Because the inclusion of that group
of fifteen judges4 with their one-year terms would considerably skew
the average length of tenure of federal judges between 1789 and 1809,
our data set does not include judges who only served on the 1801-1802
courts. Furthermore, if a federal judge sitting elsewhere was reassigned
to an 1801-1802 court, that year of service is not counted toward his
overall length of service as a federal judge.
Example: Philip Barton Key served from 2/20/1801 to 7/1/1802 on
one of these special courts. His one-year term is not included in our
data set.
Example: Samuel Hitchcock served from 9/3/1793 to 2/20/1801 on
a district court, then was reassigned to one of the 1801-1802 courts.
However, for this database, Hitchcock's length of service is only
measured by the amount of time he spent on the district court, from
9/3/1793 to 2/20/1801, or 7.47 years.
3 Judiciary Act of 1801, ch. 4, §§ 3, 6-7, 2 Stat. 89-90; see also Larry D. Kramer, The Pace
and Cause of Change, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 357, 363-64 (2004) ("The main feature of the
Judiciary Act of 1801 consisted of relieving the Supreme Court Justices of circuit-riding duties by
creating six new circuit courts staffed by sixteen new judges."). Kramer states that sixteen new
judges were created, but the Federal Judicial Center database includes only fifteen judges. See
infra note 4.
4 Those fifteen judges are: Richard Bassett, Egbert Benson, Benjamin Bourne, Joseph Clay
Jr., William Griffith, Dominic Austin Hall, Edward Harris, Samuel Hitchcock, Philip Barton Key,
Charles Magill, William McClung, Jeremiah Smith, George Keith Taylor, William Tilghman, and
Oliver Wolcott.
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2. 1983-2003. In considering the lower federal courts, a special
issue was raised due to the creation of a new federal court in 1982: the
Federal Circuit. Many judges who sat on the Federal Circuit at its
outset had previously served as judges on the non-Article III
predecessors of the Federal Circuit, such as the United States Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals. However, because these judges only
received Article III, life-tenure commissions when they began serving
on the Federal Circuit on 10/1/1982, we counted their length of service
from that date, even though some of them may have sat on other federal
non-Article III courts before then.
More generally, for this later period, we are only including federal
judges' Article III, life-tenure service. We did not include the length of
service of any time spent as a magistrate or bankruptcy judge.
Arguably, however, those terms would be important to evaluate in a
later project as these judgeships permit an individual to hold significant
forms of judicial power.
D. List of Judges Included in Our Database
To enable others to review the data, we provide a list of judges for
each period and court.
1. 1789-1809

















































Blair, John Jr. Jay, John Paterson, William
Chase, Samuel Johnson, Thomas Rutledge, John
Cushing, William Johnson, William Jr. Todd, Thomas
Ellsworth, Oliver Livingston, Henry B. Washington, Bushrod
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2. 1833-1853
Lower Courts (36)
Adams, George Dickerson, Mahlon Lee, Thomas
Barbour, Philip P. Ellis, Powhatan Mason, John Young
Boyle, John Glenn, Elias McNairy, John
Bristol, William Glenn, John Paine, Elijah
Brown, Morgan Welles Harper, Samuel Hadden Parke, Benjamin
Caldwell, Alexander Heath, Upton Scott Peck, James Hawkins
Campbell, John Wilson Holman, Jesse Lynch Pennybacker, Isaac Samuels
Conkling, Alfred Hopkinson, Joseph Pope, Nathaniel
Crawford, William Johnson, Benjamin Randall, Archibald
Cuyler, Jeremiah La Touche Jones, James McHall Rossell, William
Daniel, Peter Vivian Judson, Andrew Thompson Tappan, Benjamin
Davis, John Lawrence, Philip Kissick Thruston, Buckner
Supreme Court 9
Baldwin, Henry Johnson, William Jr. Story, Joseph
Barbour, Philip Pendelton Marshall, John Thompson, Smith
Duvall, Gabriel McKinley, John Woodbury, Levi
3. 1983-2003



















































































































Curtis, Jesse William Jr.
Dalton, Ted


























Edwards, George Clifton Jr.
Elliott, James Robert
Ely, Walter Raleigh Jr.




Ferguson, Wilkie D. Jr.
Fernandez-Badillo, Juan B.















Gadbois, Richard Arthur Jr.
Gagliardi, Lee Parsons
Garcia, Hipolito Frank
Garrity, Wendell Arthur Jr.
Gasch, Oliver






















Gunn, George F. Jr.
Hackett, Barbara Kloka




Hall, Sam Blakelev Jr.
Haltom, Elbert Bertram Jr.
Hannah, John H. Jr.
Hannay, Allen Burroughs
Hanson, William Cook







































Johnson, Frank Minis Jr.
Johnson, Norma Holloway
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Kraft, C[harles] William Jr.






Larkins, John Davis Jr.
Larson, Earl Richard
Layton, Caleb Rodney III



























Marsh, Rabe Ferguson Jr.
Marshall, Prentice Henry
Marshall, Thurgood
Martin, James Robert Jr.
Martin, John S. Jr.
Matthews, Burnita Shelton
McDonald, Gabrielle A Kirk
McGarr, Frank James










McQuade, Richard B. Jr.
Meanor, Henry Curtis
Mechem, Edwin Leard
Mentz, Henry Alvan Jr.
Meredith, James Hargrove
Meredith, Ronald Edward










Moynahan, Bernard T. Jr.















Nimmons, Ralph Wilson Jr.
Nixon, Walter Louis Jr.





O'Conor, Robert J. Jr.
Oliver, John Watkins
Orlofsky, Stephen Murray
Orrick, William Horsley Jr.
Overton, William Ray
Palmieri, Edmund Louis





Peck, John Weld II
Peckham, Robert Francis
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Robinson, Aubrey E. Jr.
Robinson, Richard Earl
Robinson, Spottswood W III
Robson, Edwin Albert









Shannon, Clyde F. Jr.
Shaw, John Malach
Simons, Charles Earl Jr.
Simpson, John Milton Bryan
Singleton, John Virgil Jr.
Sirica, John Joseph
Smith, Edward Samuel









Stanley, Arthur Jehu Jr.
Starr, Kenneth Winston
Steckler, William Elwood
Steel, Edwin DeHaven Jr.
Stephens, Albert Lee Jr.
Sterling, Ross N.
Stern, Herbert Jay
Stevens, Joseph Edward Jr.































Vollmer, Richard W. Jr.
Voorhees, Donald S.
Vukasin, John P. Jr.
Wald, Patricia McGowan
Waldman, Jay Carl







Blackmun, Harry Andrew Burger, Warren Earl Powell, Lewis Franklin Jr.
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